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Historical Hispanic Partisan Alignments, Hispanic Outreach Styles, and

the Theory of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters

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Historical Hispanic Partisan Alignments, Hispanic Outreach Styles, and the Theory of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters

by

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San Antonio, Palm Sunday, March 20, 2005

Historical Hispanic Partisan Alignments, Hispanic Outreach Styles, and the Theory of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters

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Over the last decade, the Hispanic voting community has emerged as one of the most important demographic groups in United States politics, especially in recent presidential elections. Yet there has been very little research conducted on Hispanic voter turnout and voting behavior.

When it comes to theories of minority voting behavior, resource theories significantly fail to capture the total dynamics of minority group voting behavior

and turnout. For example, Hispanics have lower SES resources, such as education and income, relative to Anglos, but so do African-Americans, yet African-Americans vote at significantly much higher rates than Hispanics. One logical explanation as for why these models fail to explain fully Hispanic turnout behavior is the fact that almost all the research conducted has been on Anglos.

This researcher proposes a new Hispanic voter model, *a theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on peripheral Hispanic voters*, that adds the concept of *self-activation vis-a-vis* group consciousness to resource and mobilization explanations. This theory is analyzed using recent San Antonio Mayoral elections, New Mexico Gubernatorial elections and Colorado Senatorial elections. Time series analyses and multiple linear regression analyses are utilized to study precinct-to-the-same-precinct and county-to-the-same-county net change in turnout between elections.

The results of these analyses strongly support the surge-and-decline theory. Specifically, Hispanic *surges* are tied to increases in peripheral Hispanic voters, and when viable Hispanic candidates seek office, Hispanic turnout increases significantly relative to both Anglo turnout and baseline Hispanic turnout, and when no viable Hispanic runs for office, Hispanic turnout decreases relatively.

This has profound future implications. If the Republican and Democratic parties want to attract more Hispanic voters for their respective candidates, then these parties must recruit, run and support viable Hispanic candidates at all levels of government, including candidates the Vice Presidency and the Presidency. Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects, this researcher posits that the first party to select a viable Hispanic Vice Presidential candidate, and ultimately a viable Presidential candidate, will be the party that realigns the majority of Hispanic voters for at least three to four decades.

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Chapter 1

Importance of Hispanic Voters and Hispanic Voter Turnout

The Latino[1] voting community has recently emerged as a critical political force in American presidential elections. In addition to recently becoming the largest racial minority group in the United States, the Latino community is the only major demographic group whose percentage of voter turnout has significantly increased over the last decade (Census Bureau 1997a, Census Bureau 2004a). The Hispanic community has the potential to become the most important demographic voting group in the United States (Gribbin 1999).

Except for Cuban-Americans in Florida, Latinos have traditionally registered and voted Democratic. Historically, most Republican party presidential candidates have ignored the broad Latino voting community and have not directly addressed issues supported by the Latino community in either the primary or general election phases of presidential campaigns. The campaign of Bob Dole in 1996 is an example of this neglectful approach of many Republican presidential candidates. With the exception of Cuban-

Americans during the Florida primary, Dole never reached out to Latino voters and seldom addressed issues important to the Hispanic community.

An alternative approach used by some Republican presidential candidates, like Pete Wilson in the 1990s, has been to openly antagonize the Hispanic community by using Latino and immigration issues as wedge issues to gain support of white conservatives. However, recently a new alternative to the two traditional Republican approaches of neglect and antagonism has emerged. In certain areas of the United States, some Republican party candidates have started to successfully attract a significant number of Latino voters (Schneider 1998). George W. Bush made unprecedented attempts to attract Hispanic voters during his 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns. No Republican presidential candidate has ever spent so much time and money trying to attract Hispanic voters as did the Bush campaigns in 2000 and 2004.

Partisan Political Dynamics and the Hispanic-Latino Community

During the last decade, the Hispanic voting community has emerged as potentially the most important demographic group in American politics. Since 1980, political strategists have focused on a series of demographic groups that have been identified as potential swing groups. First it was the Reagan Democrats, then angry white males, then it became soccer moms and more

recently married women. Hispanics could now become the next key swing group that determines the outcomes of future presidential elections.

The critical challenge for Republicans to overcome is Hispanic voters have historically and disproportionately identified themselves with the Democratic party. Over the last three decades, certain circles within the Republican party have been aware of this challenge of disproportionate party identification. Beginning in the late 1970s, Republican party activists such as Lionel Sosa, Governor George W. Bush's top Hispanic advisor and advertising consultant during the 2000 and 2004 Bush Presidential Campaigns, started to raise awareness within the Republican party about the emerging political importance of the Hispanic community.

Frank Guerra, the Republican National Committee's (RNC) lead Hispanic advertising consultant in the 2000 and 2004 campaigns, asserted Hispanics are a natural constituency group for the Republican party because "Hispanic values line up with the values of middle America" and the values of the Republican party (Sylvester 2000). Sosa, Guerra and others have asserted the Hispanic community could become a natural ally to Republican presidential candidates in about 13 states – many of which are rich with electoral votes. Furthermore, they contend Hispanics could become a

significant support group for the GOP if Republicans try to appeal to them. This vision is completely contrary to the historical conventional wisdom that the Hispanic community is, and will always remain, Democratic.

To tap into the emerging Latino voting community successfully, Republican and nonpartisan strategists generally argue the Republican party needs to make symbolic, sensitive and substantive appeals to Latinos. Some Republicans, like John McCain, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, have, at times, successfully attracted significant levels of support from within the Hispanic community through empathetic pro-Hispanic styles and sensitive policy positions. Additionally, these strategists assert Republican candidates should never offend Latinos by using anti-immigrant and anti-minority wedge issues. The use of such wedge issues, perceived as hostile and antagonistic by most of the Latino community, has led to disastrous effects for the Republican party.

Demographics of the Hispanic-Latino Community

There are five major demographic trends and factors that explain the emergence of the Hispanic community as a much sought-after demographic group in the recent presidential race. The first demographic factor leading to the increased political importance of the Latino community is its enormous

size. In the 2000 Census Hispanics represented 12 percent of the total United States Population (Census Bureau 2001a).

The second demographic trend is the astronomical growth of the Hispanic population. No major ethnic nor racial group in the United States is growing as fast as the Hispanic community (Collazo 1999). In 1900, the Hispanic population in United States was less than 1 percent (Census Bureau 2002a). One century later, the Hispanic population totaled 35.3 million people, representing 12 percent of the total population in United States (Pew Research Center 2005). The recent growth rate of the Hispanic population between the 1990 Census and the 2000 Census was 58 percent (Pew Research Center 2005). In fact, in 2000, the Hispanic population surpassed the African-American community as the largest non-white racial group in the United States (Census Bureau 2001a). Additionally, Hispanics have surpassed African-Americans as the largest racial minority group within many states such as California and Texas. In California, the Hispanic electorate doubled in less than a decade, from 7 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 1998 (Booth 2000). The massive migration of foreign-born Hispanics to United States is one reason for this tremendous and unprecedented increase in the number of voting-age Hispanics. In just eight years (1990 to 1998), the number of

foreign-born Hispanics in the United States grew 34.1 percent, from 8.0 million to 10.7 million (Census Bureau 1990, 1998). Additionally, the average Hispanic family is disproportionately large relative to other ethnic and racial groups in the United States (Census Bureau 2005).

Interrelated with this trend is the fact that the average age of Hispanics in the United States is younger than other ethnic and racial groups. The median age of Hispanics in 2000 was 26.6, whereas the median ages for non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic Blacks were 38.6 and 30.6 respectively (Census Bureau 2001a). More than 35 percent of all Hispanics are under the age of 18. These factors considered together create an ever-increasing population dynamic, like a rising pyramid, with more and more Hispanics under the age of 18 becoming voting-age citizens every day. This means that unlike other ethnic and racial groups where the number of voting-age citizens are remaining about the same, or even decreasing, the Latino voting-age population is disproportionately increasing in numbers. In California alone, more than 19,000 Hispanic citizens turn 18 every month (Schneider 1998).

Increased turnout among Hispanic registered voters is the third demographic trend that has come to the attention of many campaign strategists. This trend has been most significant in California. The effects on

the overall Republican and Democratic political strategies will be dramatic, if the trend of higher Latino turnout continues and expands to other states beyond California. Historically, Hispanic turnout has been extremely low. In the 1996 presidential election, out of the age-eligible United States citizen population, the turnout was as follows: whites had a 56.0 percent, African-Americans 50.6 percent and Hispanics 26.7 percent (Census Bureau 1997a). In the 2000 presidential election, 60.4 percent of non-Hispanic whites voted, 54.1 percent of non-Hispanic African-Americans, yet only 27.5 percent of Latinos reported to the Census Bureau they voted (Census Bureau 2002b). If the effect of non-U.S. citizenship is factored out of the 2000 results, 61.8 percent of non-Hispanic whites voted, 55.7 percent of non-Hispanic African-Americans voted, while 45.1 percent of Hispanic citizens reported they voted in 2000. Yet, in 1996, the Hispanic community was the only large demographic group in the country whose turnout actually increased (Schneider 1998). The surge in Hispanic turnout has been most dramatic in California where the Hispanic turnout was approximately two-thirds of all Hispanic registered voters in 1996 (Burns 1998). There has been a moderate spillover effect to other states, especially those in the western part of the United States. Most political observers attribute this dramatic increase to the "threats" of

issues such as Propositions 187, 209 and 227 and the use of negative campaign wedge issues by candidates such as former Republican presidential contenders Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan (Smith 1998; Purdum 1997).

The fourth major demographic trend observed by political strategists is the concentration of Hispanic population in a small number of states that are rich with electoral votes. California leads the country with 11.0 million Hispanics, followed by Texas with 6.7 million, New York with 2.9 million, Florida with 2.7 million and Illinois with 1.5 million (Census Bureau 2002b). These five states account for 168 Electoral College Votes. Overall, the Hispanic population in the United States is mostly concentrated in 11 states that hold a total of 217 Electoral College Votes. Of these 11 highly Hispanic concentrated states, it is important to note four remained "battleground" states throughout the 2004 presidential campaign and contain a total of 47 Electoral College Votes. These four states, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada and Florida have 42, 25, 20 and 17 percent Hispanic of state populations respectively. Additionally, these Latino concentrated states have experienced dramatic increases in the number of Latinos in a brief period of time (between 1990 and 1997), an increase of 2.2 million Hispanics in California, 1.4 million in Texas and .5 million in Florida (Census Bureau 1997b). Other states such as

New Jersey, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada have markedly high Hispanic growth rates. The high concentration of Hispanics in electoral-rich states, many of which are politically competitive, will have profound effects on presidential campaigns for at least the next three decades.

The fifth and final factor leading to the emerging importance of the Hispanic community is most of the Republican party has now realized continuing to ignore and alienate Latino voters is unproductive when considering the new political calculus. Many Republican candidates and political strategists, over the last three decades, have started to actively compete for Hispanic voters – voters that Republican candidates often overlooked in the past. Many, such as Sosa, major Republican fundraiser Sam Barshop and longtime Republican strategist Stuart Spencer, have encouraged the GOP to actively target and pursue the Latino vote. They have argued Latinos should feel at home in a Republican party that stands for self-reliance, hard work, support of small business, family values and anti-abortion issues (Purdum 1997; Willis 1998).

The Hispanic Community Is Not Monolithic

It is very important for political scientists and strategists to understand the Hispanic community is not monolithic and homogeneous. Most scholars

assert at least 25 major Hispanic sub-groups live in America. Political scientists have often categorized Hispanics into five broad groups: Mexican-Americans, Cuban-Americans, Puerto Rican-Americans, Central-Americans and South-Americans.

Mexican-Americans make up approximately two-thirds of the total Hispanic population in the United States, and within this group of Mexican-Americans there are three sub-groups. The first sub-group comprises immigrants who have recently arrived in the United States from Mexico. These immigrants may or may not be legal residents or citizens of the United States. Many within this group are concentrated in communities close to the Mexico-United States border, in communities like East Los Angeles and El Paso. On a socio-political level, this group generally focuses on the basic survival needs of life such as shelter, food, clothing and employment, and is thus much less politically active than others within the Mexican-American community. The second sub-group of Mexican-Americans consists of citizens who have been in the United States for two to three generations. This group is much more politically active and involved than the recent arrival group. The third sub-group consists of Mexican-American citizens whose family ties to their local community go back several generations. Many within

this group have family roots and local community connections that date from the days of governance by Spain and Mexico. These families did not move to the United States, instead the Mexico-United States border moved south, thus changing the national governmental dominion over their communities. This group tends to be active in political affairs.

The Cuban-American and Puerto Rican-American populations are about the same size in terms of numbers, but are different in terms of political tendencies and regional makeup. Cuban-Americans, located mostly in the greater Miami area, are fiercely anti-Castro, anti-communist and have been strongly pro-Republican since the Bay of Pigs fiasco during the Kennedy Administration. Puerto Rican-Americans, on the other hand, have been loyal to the Democratic Party and are generally concentrated in areas around New York and New Jersey. In general terms, Central-American and South-American Latinos are currently numerically inconsequential at the national presidential campaign level, with a notable exception of the Nicaraguan community in the Orlando area.

Chapter 2

Historical Hispanic Partisan Alignments and Partisan Hispanic Outreach Styles

The Democratic party has historically been the home of most Hispanic voter groups, with the exception of Cuban-Americans (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999; Gribbin 1999). Concurrently, Democratic presidential candidates have consistently supported favorable policy positions on issues important to most Hispanic voters. Overall, Democrats have been much more supportive than Republican candidates and have thus been traditionally more successful in attracting Latino voters. Unlike the Democratic party that has generally courted Latino voters for more than 45 years, many Republican presidential candidates have either ignored or antagonized the Latino voting community. The use of negative anti-immigrant wedge issues by several Republican presidential candidates has created many impediments to the potential attraction of Latino voters by Republican candidates. Beyond policy positioning, the *outreach styles* of Republican presidential candidates have varied widely, but have been generally antagonistic or neglectful in nature and tone toward the Hispanic community.

Most Republican presidential candidates and strategists have fallen into one of three "style groups" relating to their views on how to interact with the Hispanic community. The first group includes Republican presidential campaigns that have traditionally ignored and neglected the Latino community. The Presidential Campaign of Bob Dole in 1996, which did not make much of an effort to attract Hispanic voters, is an example of a campaign in this style group. Candidates in this group seldom appeal to Hispanic voters and usually hail from places where Hispanic voters are not a significant factor in local politics. The second group of Republicans is composed of politicians, like 1996 Presidential candidate Pete Wilson of California, who have been willing to negatively use anti-Hispanic policies as "wedge" issues in their campaigns in order to attract conservative white voters. The final group of Republicans is made up of candidates, like 2000 and 2004 Presidential Candidate George W. Bush, who believe the future viability of the Republican party is integrally tied to successfully attracting a significant number of Hispanic voters. In his 2000 campaign, Bush aggressively tried to attract Hispanic voters often describing himself as a "different kind of Republican" (Sosa 2003).

Republican strategists and candidates have been engaged in an on-going struggle about how to approach the Hispanic community for more than 20 years (Purdum 1997). If the George W. Bush-led group wins out, the Republican party could end up realigning a majority of Hispanic voters into the Republican party; however, if the Wilson faction prevails, Republicans will probably never be able to attract large percentages of Hispanic voters for at least several decades. Because the Hispanic voting bloc is truly a sleeping giant, the potential magnitude of this realignment, if successful, cannot be over stated. Many Republicans note the Hispanic community is growing faster than any other segment of the American voting public. Latinos are registering at higher rates and are turning out to vote more than ever before in the history of the Hispanic experience in the United States. From the Republican perspective, if Hispanics were to consistently vote 40 to 50 percent for Republican candidates, this would prove to be an outstanding political breakthrough and achievement.

If the Wilson group of *antagonists* or the Dole group of *neglectors* prevail, the Republicans will turn away the Hispanic community which will lead to Latinos becoming a larger-than-ever voting force within the Democratic party. The results of recent elections in California show when

Hispanic issues are used as negative wedge issues, Hispanics turnout in unprecedented numbers and vote predominantly Democratic. The Hispanic community will be mobilized and motivated to register and vote at higher percentages, actively voting against the GOP if the Wilson antagonists group gains control of the Republican message. Therefore, if the Republicans want to realign a significant majority of Hispanics into the Republican party with lasting impact, the Bush group must prevail in controlling the messages and policy positions that affect the Hispanic community. Doing so would help to prevent the development of a guilt-by-association phenomenon with the Wilson antagonists. Promoting a sensitive message is especially important since the Republican party has a history of insensitivity to minorities in general.

The Start of Hispanic Outreach: IKE? – 1952 and 1956

Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his 1952 presidential campaign, made the first effort by a presidential candidate of either major party to target Hispanic voters (Sosa 2003). What at first might appear counterintuitive – a Republican presidential candidate in the 1950s reaching out to the Hispanic community – makes more sense when analyzed within the personal context of Eisenhower's life experiences. Eisenhower had deep personal roots in South

Texas. Eisenhower and his family had spent several years living in San Antonio while he was stationed at Fort Sam Houston during two different tours of duty (Davis 1969). Additionally, Eisenhower spent a significant amount of his off-duty time at St. Mary's University helping to coach athletic teams. St. Mary's University of San Antonio has traditionally been a predominantly Hispanic college and has a reputation of activism within the Hispanic community. Eisenhower's personal convictions, which were grounded in his close contact with the Latino community in San Antonio, may better explain the outreach to Hispanic voters by Eisenhower rather than a global political strategy.

JFK's Counter Riposte – 1960

In 1960, the John F. Kennedy campaign was the first Democratic presidential campaign to systematically target Hispanic voters. Kennedy and his aides believed Kennedy's Catholicism was a natural bridge to the predominantly Catholic Hispanic community. Many scholars consider the Kennedy Latino outreach campaign to be the most extensive and comprehensive Latino outreach effort ever conducted by a presidential campaign (DeSipio, de la Garza and Setzler 1999; Gross 2000).

Until the efforts of the Eisenhower Republican campaigns, Hispanics traditionally voted around 90 percent for Democratic presidential candidates. In a clear effort to retain the Hispanic voting bloc as part of the core Democratic voting coalition, the Kennedy campaign ran both an air war (television advertising) and a ground war (grassroots mobilization) targeting both habitual and non-habitual Latino voters. The Kenney air campaign ran a television advertisement featuring Jackie Kennedy saying in Spanish, "my husband always pays attention to the interests of all sectors of American society" (Gross 2000). This is the first known television advertisement to feature a presidential candidate's wife and the first known television advertisement produced in Spanish.

The prime component of the Kennedy campaign ground war was an extensive network of *Viva Kennedy!* clubs in Latino communities throughout the United States. The 1960 Kennedy campaign conducted what is generally considered the most elaborate and extensive grassroots mobilization effort ever for a presidential campaign. The hallmark of the 1960 *Viva Kennedy* campaign was it targeted both habitual and non-habitual voters and it went beyond macro-media advertising with the creation of an across-the-board, mass grassroots campaign structure to mobilize and get out the Latino vote.

Return of Neglect by Both Parties – 1964 to 1972

From 1964 through 1972, there were relatively minimal levels of formalized Hispanic outreach activities by both Democratic and Republican presidential campaigns. During these election cycles, the Democratic presidential candidates received approximately 80 percent or more of the Hispanic votes. The presidential campaigns from 1964 to 1972 were in many ways similar to the pre-1952 presidential campaigns because most Hispanics voted for the Democratic presidential candidate and there was little or no dedicated outreach efforts to mobilize Hispanic voters by either of the parties. One can explain the reason for the lack of extensive Latino outreach programs during this time frame in part because the battleground states during these elections generally had relatively fewer Hispanic voters.

The enlightened sensitivity shown by Eisenhower and Kennedy toward the Hispanic community was spawned primarily by their personal life experiences and viewpoints rather than by a grand political strategy and was at a time when presidential campaigns were becoming ever more candidate centered, and less party driven and controlled. None of the presidential candidates from 1964 through 1972 had extensive interpersonal interaction with the Hispanic community, with the exception of Lyndon B. Johnson. As

for Johnson in 1964, the campaign was so one-sided in Johnson's favor that he did not need to tactically mobilize the Hispanic community.

Ford's False Start – 1976

In 1976, during the presidential Republican primary campaign against Ronald Reagan, Gerald Ford made a concerted effort to attract Hispanic voters in the critical swing state of Texas. While at a campaign rally in front of the Alamo, President Ford was handed a tamale to eat as part of a photo-op, at which time Ford proceeded "with gusto" to bite through the corn husk rather than taking it off first (Popkin 1994, 1). Ford's incorrect consumption of this Mexican culinary delight was so embarrassing his gaffe was printed on the front page of the *New York Times*. Samuel Popkin asserts Ford's misfortune in front of the Alamo, rightly or wrongly, proved to be a negative cue about Ford's level of sensitivity toward the Hispanic community.

This incident became symbolic of Ford's lack of understanding of the Latino community throughout the United States. In response to a reporter's question, at Ford's first White House press conference after his loss to Jimmy Carter, to name the single most important lesson he had learned from the campaign, Ford responded learning how to shuck a tamale (Popkin 1994).

If presidential candidates want to be successful in attracting Latino voters, it is critical for candidates to show sensitivity and compassion toward the Latino community. Latino voters feel more comfortable with a candidate who seems to "understand" their community by demonstrating a knowledge of foods, music, language, customs and cultural traditions. The contrary also holds true. As with Ford in 1976, if a presidential candidate shows a lack of understanding of the Latino community, it is unlikely the Latino voting community will vote for that particular candidate. Juxtaposed to Ford, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was successful in his outreach activities to the Hispanic community. Carter actively pursued Hispanic voters and is generally considered the first presidential candidate ever personally to speak Spanish on the campaign trail. With the help of a strong showing in the predominantly Hispanic voting precincts in south Texas, Carter narrowly beat Ford in Texas, thus contributing significantly to Carter's close Electoral College victory in 1976.

Reagan the Republican Trailblazer – 1980

Reagan was more successful than any other Republic presidential candidate ever before in attracting Hispanic voters and was especially successful in attracting Cuban Latinos. In 1980, Reagan received

approximately 37 percent of the Hispanic vote (DeSipio, de la Garza and Setzler 1999).

Reagan's anti-Castro and anti-communism rhetoric resonated with Cuban-Americans in the Miami-Dade County area. In many ways, Reagan's successful strategic efforts to target Cuban-Americans in the Little Havana community during his 1980 campaign significantly solidified the realignment of Cuban-Americans to the Republican party. Before the Bay of Pigs disaster during the Kennedy administration, Cuban-Americans voted mostly for Democratic presidential candidates (Moreno and Warren 1999).

For the first time ever, a Republican presidential candidate fully utilized a Latino advertising agency to produce and place Hispanic targeted advertisements. Reagan hired Lionel Sosa of San Antonio to coordinate Latino media advertising and marketing. Sosa created several television advertisements targeting Hispanics in the southwestern United States emphasizing the policy themes of pro-family, anti-communism, pro-military and individual responsibility. Reagan strongly believed the core Republican issues, such as pro-family, anti-abortion, anti-communism and individual responsibility, would attract a large number of Hispanic voters. Reagan once

even told Sosa Hispanics "are Republicans, they just don't know it" (Sosa 2003).

Reagan the Backslider – 1984

During his reelection campaign in 1984, Reagan was far less successful in attracting Latino voters than he was in 1980. Reagan attracted conservative Hispanic voters in 1984, but was not successful in attracting moderate Hispanic voters. The degradation of Hispanic support for Reagan can be mostly explained by the policy positions and political actions taken by Reagan during his first term. Had Reagan appointed more Latinos to senior levels of his administration and had he been more sensitive to policy concerns of the Hispanic community, he might have been able to increase the level of Hispanic support in 1984. Reagan initially was a good campaigner within the Latino community; however, many of his core policy positions were either irrelevant or antagonistic to the Latino voting community.

Neglect by Both Parties: Take Two – 1988

The outreach efforts of the 1988 presidential campaign were just as modest in scope as the 1964 through 1972 campaigns and, as a result, most Hispanics voted for the Democratic president candidate. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) participated in several voter registration drives

during the spring and summer months, but these registration drives were not followed-up with comprehensive mobilization and get-out-the-vote efforts. Because of dwindling resources, the DNC choose to put more resources into other targeted voting groups rather than into the Latino community. Many within the national Democratic leadership took the Hispanic voting bloc for granted assuming presidential candidate Michael Dukakis would receive 70 percent or more of the Latino votes.

The unexpected death early in the 1988 campaign of Willie Velasquez, who was the most vocal champion of a comprehensive and well-funded Democratic Latino outreach program, further weakened the Democratic Latino outreach efforts during the campaign. No one was successful in pursuing Velasquez's vision of a comprehensive outreach program during the 1988 general campaign. Concurrently, many Republican strategists believed the Hispanic community was not in "play" during this campaign cycle, and did not see it as a worthwhile investment to expend limited Republican resources trying to move this community. Ironically, it was during this campaign cycle that many down-ballot Republican candidates at the state and local level started to solicit and successfully receive increased Hispanic voter support (Sosa 2003).

Clinton's Vision, a Return to 1960 Levels of Outreach – 1992

For tactical, strategic and philosophical reasons, the 1992 Bill Clinton presidential campaign conducted a well-planned and integrated effort to reach out to the Latino community. The Clinton campaign in 1992 was the first presidential campaign since the 1960 John F. Kennedy presidential campaign to dedicate significant levels of resources to *both* advertising and grassroots mobilization. As part of his outreach to minority groups, Clinton repeatedly stated throughout his 1992 campaign if elected his administration would "look more like America" (Subervi-Vélez and Cunningham 1999).

Several presidential campaigns between Kennedy's 1960 campaign and Clinton's 1992 campaign employed the use of television and radio advertising to actively target Hispanic voters. However, none of the campaigns between 1960 and 1992 fully and effectively utilized *ground* forces to mobilize traditionally low voting segments of the Hispanic community. By combining an air strategy with ground mobilization, Clinton was effective in turning-out Latino voters, even seeing some marginal improvement toward the Democrats with Cuban-American voters in Florida.

The Electoral College strategy of the Clinton campaign included tactical initiatives in many states with significant levels of Latino voters such

as Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Nevada and New Mexico (Shaw 1999). Clinton had both philosophical and tactical reasons to actively reach out to the Hispanic community. Additionally, Clinton strategists were keenly aware of the recent successes many Republican candidates were having in attracting Hispanic voters at the state and local levels and were concerned about what could happen to the Latino vote if the Democrats took the Latino community for granted (Cisneros 2000).

Clinton II, the Most Comprehensive Hispanic Outreach Yet – 1996

Clinton's 1996 Latino outreach campaign has been considered the best and most effective Hispanic outreach campaign of any presidential campaign (Cisneros 2000). Andy Hernandez is credited for creating the Clinton presidential Latino outreach campaign strategy (Subervi-Vélez and Cunningham 1999; Cisneros 2000). Working out of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and reporting directly to Donald Fowler, the DNC chair, Hernandez orchestrated the creation of the Office of Latino Outreach (OLO). OLO developed and implemented a top-to-bottom Latino outreach campaign which utilized the resources of the DNC, the Clinton-Gore presidential campaign and the Latino presidential political appointees throughout the administration.

The OLO initiatives included polling and research, traditional outreach efforts, opposition research, development and distribution of targeted messages relevant to the Hispanic community. Additionally, it coordinated a surrogate program of Latino leaders both inside and outside of the administration, orchestrated earned media events, oversaw the production and placement of television advertising via two different Latino advertising firms and proactively contacted Latino media outlets. In most instances, the initiatives and activities of OLO targeted specific Latino sub-groups or specific geographic markets throughout the United States.

There are three main reasons why the 1996 Democratic presidential Latino outreach campaign was so successful (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999). First, candidate Bill Clinton was very supportive of specialized ethnic sub-campaigns. Second, the Director of OLO, Andy Hernandez, was strategically and tactically brilliant in the development and implementation of the overall Latino outreach effort. Finally, OLO had many champions throughout the Clinton administration and the Clinton-Gore campaign, most notably Cabinet Secretaries Federico Peña and Henry Cisneros who garnered adequate levels of funding and respect for OLO through the duration of the campaign, and throughout the campaign structure.

Pete Wilson's Antagonist Assault on the Hispanic Community – 1996

Candidates like Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan have attempted to use Latino and Mexican immigrant issues as wedge issues to gain support of white conservative voters, especially during the presidential primary season of their respective campaigns. Because of the controversial nature of these policy positions, the media has generally given pronouncements on these issues increased media coverage. As a result, these types of candidates have openly antagonized the Hispanic community.

From a Republican perspective this approach forfeits Hispanic voters to the Democrats and activates Hispanic voters to turnout at higher than average rates for Democratic presidential candidates. As part of Wilson's strategic political positioning both in California and for his 1996 presidential candidacy, he staked out four antagonistic policy positions: the discontinuance of public and social services to illegal aliens (California Proposition 187); the discontinuance of race/ethnicity and gender affirmative action in public education and state contracting of services (California Proposition 209); the discontinuance of bilingual education (California Proposition 227); and the pursuit of hostile positions toward the Mexican Government involving common border issues.

In 1994, proponents of banning undocumented immigrants from receiving public services, such as education, social and medical services, formally introduced Proposition 187 as the *Save Our State* (SOS) initiative. Pete Wilson argued banning of undocumented immigrants from receiving public services was critical to protect California's treasury and way of life. The opponents, on the other hand, thought Proposition 187 was a wedge issue that played to the fears of a cultural, economic and ethnic *invasion* from Mexican immigrants crossing the California border. Proposition 187 stated:

> [Californians] have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens . . . [Californians thus] have a right to the protection of their government from any person or persons entering this country unlawfully [and to] prevent illegal aliens from receiving benefits or public services in the State of California (State of California 1994).

On November 9, 1994, Proposition 187 passed with 59 percent in favor and 41 percent in opposition.

Prior to 1994, Wilson, as the Mayor of San Diego and as a United States Senator, was perceived by many political observers as an ideological moderate, middle-of-the-road Republican, who in some circles

was even considered a liberal Republican. Because of the weakened California economy, due in large part to defense industry cutbacks and a general national recession, Governor Wilson's approval rating was at an all-time low in 1993 (Tolbert and Hero 1996; McDonnell 1997; Johnson 1996). Early in the election process, Kathleen Brown, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, led Wilson in the polls by as much as 23 percentage points (Tolbert and Hero 1996). Wilson was in significant political trouble and stood a strong chance of being upset by Brown.

It was at this time Wilson decided to capitalize on the growing dissatisfaction with the *flood* of illegal aliens crossing the border of Mexico into California. After polling, Wilson calculated he could hook his political wagon onto the anti-immigration ground swell and ride the coattails of Proposition 187 to victory. Wilson then made immigration, specifically Proposition 187, his number one issue in the campaign – so much so that during the debates with Brown, immigration and Proposition 187 was the most discussed issue (Jamieson 1998). Wilson often spoke of the need to "send Washington a message" regarding immigration policies. Wilson went as far as to run reelection television commercials showing footage of illegal

aliens streaming across the border with a voice-over saying "they keep coming . . ." (Purdum 1997). Wilson correctly calculated the interlocking of his campaign with Proposition 187 would lead to his come-from-behind victory. On election day in 1994, Wilson received 55 percent of the vote, beating Brown by 15 percentage points, an amazing 38 percentage point reversal from his lowest point in the polls.

As with Proposition 187, Wilson actively campaigned for Proposition 209, a California initiative designed to end affirmative action especially relating to the selection and admission of students to colleges and universities and for the awarding of government contracts. This initiative was formally titled *California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI)* and was orchestrated by Governor Wilson. Wilson acted as the Honorary Chair of the Campaign, and with Ward Connerly, led and organized the campaign. After an extremely hostile campaign, Proposition 209 passed by the California voters on November 5, 1996, with 54 percent in favor and 46 percent in opposition. After the passage of Proposition 209, Wilson aggressively led the defense of Proposition 209 in the many legal challenges in the State and Federal Courts.

Many opponents of Wilson charged he was using Propositions 187 and 209 as wedge issues: Proposition 187 to revive his reelection as Governor in

1994 and Proposition 209 to set up his Presidential run in 1996. Some strategists theorized Wilson was perceived to be too moderate to win conservative Republican presidential primaries and caucuses because he was pro-choice on abortions and his aggressive positions on environmental issues. Therefore, Wilson supported a few right-wing issues in order to build his conservative credentials. As for the State of California, the combination of Proposition 187 and 209 led to extremely pronounced fissures between many groups within the state. Some theorists such as Marelius (1998) assert the sharp break between Wilson and the Hispanic community was the result of the abrasive rhetoric and advertising used by Wilson as much as his policy positions.

The final perceived anti-Hispanic initiative in a sequence of polarizing California propositions was Proposition 227, formally titled *English Language in Public Schools*. The purpose of Proposition 227 was to dismantle bilingual education programs in California schools and replace these programs with one-year English emersion programs. Formally this initiative amended the California Education Code in such a way as to change how "limited English proficient" (LEP) students were to be educated. As with Propositions 187 and 209, Wilson actively supported Proposition 227. Wilson described bilingual

education as “one of the great misfired good intentions of our time” (Smith 1998).

As with many controversial issues, Proposition 227 had many *sub rosa* facets that persisted underneath the surface of the general public debate. Crawford (1997), Marelius (1998) and Purdum (1997) contend there was a reservoir of distrust, anger, and in some circles hate against Hispanics and other immigrant groups, that permeated the white voting population in California. So many voters feared a *flood* of immigration from Mexico that polling research picked up significant levels of trepidation about being *overwhelmed* and *overtaken* by Mexican nationals and Hispanics. Many feared the decline of communities, an increase of crime in neighborhoods and a switch to Spanish as the primary language. The recent increases in the use of Spanish in the everyday workings of local society and commerce especially frustrated many white voters. On June 2, 1988, Proposition 227 was approved by the California voters with 61 percent in favor and 39 percent in opposition.

By the time the Proposition 227 election occurred in 1998, California voters and citizens had been exposed to three consecutive election cycles filled with direct and indirect messages that were extremely negative toward the Latino and Mexican national communities. For more than seven years, there

was a continuous and sustained sequence of anti-Hispanic messages in the public arena. Additionally, Wilson's anti-Hispanic persona was reinforced and amplified by his insensitive dealings with Mexican elected officials regarding border policy issues. Unlike the other three United States state governors along the Mexican border, Wilson had a strained and, at times nonexistent, relationships with his Mexican counterparts. His relationships with Mexican officials often were surprisingly undiplomatic and hostile. Wilson regularly and harshly complained about Mexico's handling of border issues such as immigration, drug smuggling and pollution. Additionally, he actively and aggressively opposed the certification of Mexico as a cooperative partner in the drug war. Unlike the other American border governors, Wilson never even met with then Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo.

Wilson never again attempted a serious outreach effort to the Hispanic community after his initial insensitive messages. His anti-Hispanic image was forever impressed in the minds of most Hispanic voters when he used his "They Keep Coming" television advertisement during the 1994 gubernatorial reelection campaign. This advertisement, for many voters in California, was reminiscent of the 1988 Willie Horton presidential advertisement. The result was a devastating set of losses in the 1998 California election. The

Democratic candidate for governor, Gray Davis, beat Republican Dan Lungren by a 20 percentage point landslide. Republicans lost many of the open seat elections throughout the state that year as well. Wilson single-handedly reversed the previous trend of increasing Hispanic voting support for Republican candidates in California by decreasing the appeal of the Republican party and motivating the Hispanic voter turnout in favor of Democrats throughout California (Cannon and Booth 1999). This anti-Hispanic image of Wilson, the top Republican in the most populated state in the United States, bled over from the California Republican party to the national Republican party, thus hurting many GOP candidates around the country with Latino voters. This phenomenon is analogous to Richard Shingles' theory in terms of African-American consciousness and political participation in his research on African-American political participation and voter turnout (Shingles 1981).

When Wilson first ran for governor in 1990, before advocating support of Propositions 187, 209 and 227, he received 44 percent of the Hispanic vote. In 1994, on the same ballot with Proposition 187, he only received 25 percent of the Hispanic vote. Then in 1998, Republican gubernatorial candidate Dan Lungren received about 20 percent of the Hispanic vote (Sullivan 1998).

Long-time Republican strategist Stuart Spencer said this "trend [the loss of Hispanic support] is obvious and the political danger is real . . . [the Republican party risks] political suicide and dooms itself to permanent minority status in California" if this trend is not reversed. Spencer went on to say "[w]e are dramatically losing market share of the fastest growing segment of the electorate" (Purdum 1997).

The irony of Wilson's anti-Hispanic positioning is many political observers in the early 1990s perceived Wilson as the first national "compassionate conservative" (Marelius 1998). Wilson is arguably one of the most successful politicians California has ever had of either party, with the possible exceptions of Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon. Yet when Wilson was in political trouble in 1994, he lurched to the right and admittedly used Proposition 187 as a wedge issue to turn his impending loss into an upset win. Then, when he became an active candidate for the Republican nomination for President in 1995, Wilson turned to what had worked for him in 1994 – the use of racial and ethnic wedge issues. Beyond Proposition 187 rhetoric, he added anti-affirmative action messages to his core messages in his 1996 presidential campaign. At best, Wilson's message was perceived as

insensitive and callous; at worst, his harsh driving rhetoric was extremely mean spirited.

The use of Proposition 187 as a wedge issue proved to be a short-term success for Wilson's 1994 reelection effort but the long-term damage to the Republican party has been dramatic and disastrous. By 1998, California had functionally become a one-party state in state-wide races. Many Republican strategists are asking whether the damage caused by the anti-Latino messages can be reversed in the near future or whether it will take an extended period of time to repair the damaging effects of Wilson. The Democratic control of the post-2000 redistricting process in California exacerbated the damage done to the Republican party nationwide by Wilson. Lance Tarrance, a GOP pollster and a key Republican strategist in 2000, described Wilson's behavior and actions as "a case history of what not to do" (Marinucci 2000). Wilson remains politically unrepentant saying in a feature newspaper interview:

> People who refer to wedge issues are generally liberals who want to duck the issue. Wedge issues are real issues. They are problems calling out for attention. (Marelius 1998).

Bob Dole and the Return of Traditional Republican Neglect – 1996

The 1996 Bob Dole presidential campaign is an example of the traditional neglect by many Republican presidential candidates of the Latino community. Except for a limited tactical outreach program by the Dole campaign to Hispanic elites in the states of Texas, New York, California and Florida during the primary season, none of the 1996 Republican presidential contenders seriously attempted to reach out to Latino voters. Believing Latino voters were part of the traditional Democratic bloc, Lamar Alexander, Steve Forbes, Alan Keyes and others did not feel that allocation of the scarce resources of time and money to Latino outreach programs was a worthwhile endeavor.

Dole's victorious turning point in the 1996 Republican nominating campaign came on Super Tuesday when Dole emerged as the undisputed leader in the race for the Republican nomination as a result of the strong Cuban-American support in Florida. In Florida, Dole actively worked to attract Cuban-American voters, specifically in the Miami-Dade County area. Mostly due to Dole's very forceful anti-communist, anti-Castro rhetoric, Dole advantageously lined up endorsements from the most influential Cuban-American political elites in Florida. Dole received more than 80 percent of

Cuban-Americans in Dade County which helped Dole to receive 57 percent of the overall statewide vote (Moreno and Warren 1999).

After receiving the Republican nomination, Dole's outreach program to Latino voters during the 1996 general election phase was minimal as he seldom addressed important issues of the Latino community. As it turned out, he did not want to antagonize the conservative right, especially in the key battleground state of California. Many within the campaign thought Dole could not win the presidency unless he won California. Because of this *must-win California strategy*, Dole became a politically expedient supporter of California Proposition 187 like Pete Wilson. It should be noted in the early stages of the general election campaign, Dole tried to balance the need to win California with the desire to appeal to Latinos. Overtime, his political schizophrenia became too difficult to reconcile and the need to win California prevailed. Although he succeeded in attracting Cuban-Americans during the Florida primary and Latino voters in other primary states, his campaign made a fatally strategic decision to distance Dole from potential Hispanic voters during the 1996 general election. This resulted in a conspicuous public avoidance of Latino and Cuban-American voters by Dole during most of the general election campaign.

Although Dole had the same policy position as Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan on Preposition 187, his tone was more civil than Wilson and Buchanan who openly and harshly used Proposition 187 as an antagonist wedge issue. Dole preferred whenever possible to avoid issues like Proposition 187, whereas Wilson and Buchanan relished the aggressive use of these types of issues in the political rhetoric of the campaign. However, he did poorly with Hispanics in the general election campaign because he essentially ignored the Hispanic Community. His poor performance with Latino votes also carried over to Cuban-American voters. Because of Dole's avoidance of the Cuban-American community and Bill Clinton's aggressive outreach to Cuban-Americans, Clinton received more Cuban-American votes than any other Democratic presidential candidate in the post Bay of Pigs Era, with Clinton almost winning a plurality of the Cuban-American votes.

Change in GOP Outreach, Bush's Gubernatorial Races – 1994 and 1998

George W. Bush did not face citizen-initiated propositions like 187, 209 and 227 while governor of Texas, yet he did make his concerns and uneasiness about these issues publicly known. Bush openly spoke out against these propositions, calling them "divisive" (Smith 1998). Unlike Wilson, he refused to cut back certain social services benefitting illegal immigrants

(Mayes 1999). Bush also said "I was against the spirit of Prop 187 for my state . . . I felt like every child ought to be educated regardless of the status of their parents" (Schneider 1999). Regarding bilingual education, Bush actively promoted and embraced bilingualism. He often talked about the advantages of learning both English and Spanish, and regularly conducted interviews in Spanish.

Beyond these issues, Bush diligently worked to develop relationships with Mexican governmental officials. Bush met with President Zedillo four times in his first four years as governor of Texas and vigorously supported NAFTA as well as the certification of Mexico's anti-drug efforts, whereas, Wilson never met with Zedillo and was very critical of Mexico's anti-drug endeavors. During his governorship, Bush met regularly with his elected counterparts from Mexico and even celebrated *Cinco de Mayo* with Mexican border governors and officials.

Bush worked vigorously to create a pro-Hispanic style and actively pursued Hispanic voters. At campaign events, Bush would often have Hispanic elected officials introduce him, sometimes even Democrats. He spoke some Spanish during almost every campaign speech he gave, and always strategically used Spanish-language advertising to reach out to the

Hispanic community. Lionel Sosa, a long-time Bush strategist for Hispanic campaign advertising, actively promoted a pro-Hispanic culture within the inner-circles of Bush campaigns. Some observers like Domencio Maceri (1999) have asserted showing interest in the Hispanic community, openly speaking Spanish, and being generally sensitive to the issues of the Hispanic community is critical in order to gain an "emotional entree to voters minds." *Substance* is what matters over the long term, but *style* is what opens the communication channels. For a Republican, Bush received record levels of support from the Hispanic community in the 1998 gubernatorial election due to his outreach efforts to the Hispanic community.

Bush's Unique Hispanic Outreach Goes National – 2000

For the most part, Democratic strategists have done very little to actuate the recent change in Latino voting behavior. Instead, it has been the actions of antagonistic Republicans like Wilson and Buchanan that have pushed conservative and independent Hispanic voters back into the Democratic party. Spencer, the Republican strategist, warned:

> Our [the Republican] party has a sad history of alienating immigrant groups and new voters . . . [t]he GOP closed the door to Irish and Italian immigrants in Massachusetts and New York in the last century.

> We [Republicans] did the same to Poles and other Eastern Europeans in Chicago and other urban centers. We did it again to Asian-Americans in Hawaii (Purdum 1997).

Sosa, Guerra, Spencer and Tarrance posit the long term viability of the Republican party is directly tied to the successful attraction of a substantial number of Hispanics. These strategists note until 1994, Republicans were successfully attracting Hispanic voters away from the Democrats. These Republican strategists assert, pre-1994, the Democrats' *assumption* of Latino support may well have provided the opportunity needed for Republicans to attract significant and meaningful levels of Latino voters around the nation. Additionally, Spencer and Tarrance have asserted it is imperative for Republican strategists and candidates to comprehend the post-1994 mega-shift of Hispanics back to the Democratic party was self-inflected by Republican candidates, and was not a result of any efforts by the Democratic party. Most Bush strategists believe that the relative loss of Hispanic support by Republicans in the 1990s is a result of situational political calculations made by Wilson and others. Additionally, it was these actions that gave the Democrats a chance to win back a major segment of conservative and independent Hispanic voters who were beginning to vote for Republicans.

Sosa, Guerra and Tarrance believed to be successful in attracting Hispanic voters during the 2000 presidential campaign the Bush campaign had to follow a five-step process (Sosa 2003; Guerra 2000). First, the Latino community had to believe both the Bush campaign and Bush the candidate were sensitive toward and welcoming of Latinos. Second, the campaign, through advertising and appearances, had to address issues relevant to the Latino community. Third, because of the past history of Republican insensitivities toward Latinos, the 2000 Bush campaign would have to spend unprecedented levels of funds on Latino outreach. Fourth, the advertising and outreach had to focus on Bush the individual candidate and not on Bush the Republican party nominee. Finally, to be successful beyond the 2000 campaign, if he won the election, the Bush administration would have to follow through on the campaign rhetoric to demonstrated this was not just a one time, politically expedient outreach effort.

Throughout the 2000 campaign, Guerra and Tarrance were particularly mindful of future Republican outreach efforts to Latinos. They viewed the 2000 Republican Latino outreach program as a first step in a 10- to 20-year initiative that could ultimately yield a majority of Latino voters for Republican presidential candidates on a routine basis. They thought it would be important

to be patient, yet vigilant and steady, when reaching out to Latino voters. Because of the actions and positions taken by antagonistic Republicans such as Wilson during the 1990s, they believed it would be unlikely Bush could regain the Republican losses of the 1990s in the short-term. Furthermore, to regularly attract Hispanic voters, Republicans would have to develop a long-term strategy of engagement.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush worked in an unprecedented way for a Republican presidential candidate to create a sensitive campaign that presented a welcoming image to Latino voters. For Bush to ultimately be successful in attracting Latino voters, he first had to create an "emotional entree to voters minds" (Maceri 1999). Bush aggressively tried from the start to foster this welcoming atmosphere through symbolism, style and policy positioning. From speaking some Spanish at almost every rally to addressing some of the issues important to Hispanics, Bush strived to present a pro-Latino image of himself, his campaign and a would be Bush administration. Bush often spoke at rallies and in interviews of the need to reach out to the Hispanic community and the need to be sensitive to Hispanic issues. At a speech in Los Angeles on April 7, 2000 to

the National Hispanic Women's Conferences, Bush said:

> It's so important to have leadership that tears down barriers, leadership that offers a future hopeful for everybody, leaders that reject the politics of pitting one group of people against each other (Orlov 2000).

Unlike past Republican outreach efforts that were narrowly limited to the Cuban-American community and which were often presented in a vacuum, the Bush campaign was conspicuous with its Latino outreach efforts. Michael Madrid, a GOP consultant in California, said the Republican party "genuinely believes that Hispanics will be a conspicuous part of the new majority [the Bush winning coalition]" (Marinucci 2000). This *welcoming* approach was also evident at the Republican Convention in Philadelphia when several Hispanics were showcased and a California delegate gave a prime-time speech entirely in Spanish. Arturo Vargas, Executive Director of the National Association of Latino Elected Officials in Los Angeles thought Bush's Latino outreach efforts "should not go unnoticed" and Bush was helped by the fact Hispanics were "all over the stage" in Philadelphia (Green 2000).

Many supporters within the Bush campaign believed it was imperative to create an opening with Hispanic voters early in the campaign in order to engender credibility with Hispanic voters before the general election in

November. To this end, the Bush campaign kicked off their Hispanic advertising campaign with a Spanish radio advertisement in Iowa on October 26, 1999. Then on February 7, 2000, for the first time in a presidential primary contest, the Bush campaign ran a Spanish-language television advertisement in Arizona. Later in the election cycle campaign, the Bush campaign produced several television advertisements in English and Spanish that featured George P. Bush, a nephew of George W. Bush who is half Hispanic. In one of these spots, George P. Bush states his uncle believes in "opportunity for every American, for every Latino" (Meckler 2000; Sosa 2003). Overall, the advertising outreach to Hispanic voters during the 2000 Bush campaign was unprecedented for a Republican presidential candidate. Beyond paid advertising activities, the Bush campaign worked determinedly to receive pro-Latino earned media exposers, making an unprecedented number of campaign appearances targeting Latino voters. Sosa noted these campaign appearances were more productive than ever in moving polling numbers (Sosa 2003).

On a policy positioning level, the second element of the overall 2000 Hispanic outreach program, Bush tried to appeal to Hispanics with "middle-class family issues," such as, education reform, a senior citizen prescription

drug program, pro-military, pro-small business, self reliance, commitment to families, Social Security reform and middle-class tax cuts. Many within the RNC and the Bush campaign presumed an overall package of middle-class Republican issues would appeal to independent and conservative Hispanic voters. During the early stages of the campaign, Bush presented these middle-class issues at campaign appearances, through Hispanic surrogates, and in the general market English-language advertising. Additionally, Bush tried to be Latino friendly regarding Latino specific issues such as immigration and United States-Mexico border policy issues. Bush frequently declared he empathized with undocumented workers entering the United States from Mexico often saying in speeches that "[f]amily values don't stop at the Rio Grande" (UPI 2000). During the campaign, Bush often said if elected he "will look to the South, not as an after-thought" but as a key component of America's foreign policy (NPR 2001).

Late in the campaign, polling determined the two most crucial issues for Bush to focus on were education and health-care reform. The final two Spanish-language television advertisements produced and placed by the RNC addressed education and prescription drugs/health care respectively. These Spanish-language advertisements by the RNC were placed in several

predictable states such as California, Florida, Nevada and New Mexico, as well as some unexpected target markets within the states of Pennsylvania, Washington State, Alaska, Oregon and Georgia. These advertising spots were targeted and purchased at the local media market unit level and were not statewide nor national buys. This microscopic targeting technique provides for precise placement of media buys, which makes the advertising generally more effective and much more cost efficient, and is reminiscent of the 1996 Clinton television and radio placements.

The third element of the Bush Hispanic outreach program was to develop a well-funded, highly integrated and holistic Latino advertising campaign. Bush's Latino advertising outreach program included English-language television and radio commercials, Spanish-language television and radio commercials, as well as print advertising. It is commonly accepted in political advertising circles that most Hispanic voters receive the majority of their news and political information from English-language television. In an attempt to address this understanding, the Bush campaign made a conscious and concerted effort to include Hispanic images in their general market English-language television advertising (Meckler 2000; Sosa 2003). Additionally, the Bush campaign created Hispanic targeted, English-language

advertisements that used Hispanic motifs often featuring Hispanics within group and family settings using English. According to Hector Orci, a corporate Latino advertising executive, this framing is important since "the center of the universe in Latino culture is the family" as compared to many other racial and ethnic groups where the "individual" is the focal point, therefore, it is critical to produce Hispanic targeted advertisements with family and group images (Press Democrat 2000).

The Bush advertising team produced all the Hispanic targeted advertisements within the rubrics of the overall strategic messaging system of the campaign, using issues the overall general market campaign was simultaneously presenting. Lionel Sosa, who produced Bush's Hispanic targeted advertisements, reported directly to Mark McKinnon, the chief media director for the Bush campaign, and indirectly to Karl Rove, the chief political architect of the campaign. During the general election phase, the Bush team ran almost all of the English-language Hispanic motif television spots in Florida and New Mexico. These spots were put into a rotation schedule with the general market English-language advertisements, almost proportionate to the percentage Hispanic population within each state.

Beyond English-language advertisements, both the Bush campaign and the RNC produced and placed Spanish radio and television spots. Bush began his Spanish-language radio advertising campaign during the Iowa caucus campaign, thus becoming the first Republican presidential candidate to ever use Spanish-language advertising in the state of Iowa. The radio advertisement starts with an announcer saying in Spanish "[o]nce again, the spotlight is on Iowa . . . and for the first time, its shining on the Latino community . . . we're voters too and George W. Bush believes that all Iowans should help elect a president." The advertisement continues with the announcer saying "in this presidential campaign, you will see a fresh start, the beginning of a new day for Latinos . . . [George Bush] believes that the American dream belongs to everyone." The spot ends with George Bush saying in Spanish "this is George W. Bush . . . it's a new day" (David 1999; Cross 1999).

Bush's Spanish-language television campaign kicked off during the run-up to the Arizona Republican primary on February 22, 2000. This was the first time a Spanish-language television advertisement and a dedicated Latino media campaign had ever been used in a presidential primary campaign (Press Democrat 2000; Marinucci 2000). The television spot opens with a male

voice-over saying in Spanish "[e]n nuestro pais ha llegado un nuevo dia." Translated to English, the advertisement says "in our country, a new day has arrived." The spot focuses on Bush's family values and ends with Bush saying in Spanish "[e]s un nuevo dia." This tag line – *it is a new day* – was used for two reasons. First, the Bush campaign wanted to subtly tie Gore to Clinton and promote the idea a Bush administration would be different from the Clinton-Gore administration. Secondly, the Bush campaign wanted conservative and independent Latino voters to see Bush as "a new kind of Republican" who was different from past Republican presidential candidates. The theme of *a new day* and *a fresh start* were often used in advertisements and campaign speeches (Bruni 1999; Sosa 2003; Guerra 2000).

Why was the Bush campaign the first ever presidential campaign to commence its Hispanic targeted advertising program in the primary season? The simple answer is it was part of an overall campaign strategy to attract Hispanic voters. One might argue buying Spanish-language radio in Iowa is not tactically significant since in relative terms the cost of Spanish-language radio in Iowa is so inexpensive. However, beyond a localized tactical campaign decision, the Bush campaign intended strategically to send a message to Latinos across the United States that Bush was serious about his

desire to attract Hispanic voters both in the primary and general election phases of the campaign. The Bush campaign received extensive media coverage about this decision to place Spanish-language advertisements so early in the campaign.

The placement of Spanish-language spots by the Bush campaign in Arizona was also strategic because it was part of a comprehensive attempt to eliminate McCain from the presidential Republican nomination race by beating him in his own state. The Bush team developed this plan after Arizona Senator John McCain defeated Bush in the New Hampshire primary. In his senate campaigns, McCain had become successful in drawing Latino voters, drawing around 55 percent of the Arizona Latino voters in 1998. During his 1998 senate reelection campaign, McCain used advertisements that dubbed Spanish over his general market English spots. The Bush campaign, therefore, believed it was important to include Spanish-language advertising as part of the overall strategic effort to push McCain out of the race.

Reagan's attraction of 37 percent of the Hispanic vote in 1980, according to the Republican party conventional wisdom, is the high watermark for the Republican presidential candidates. In 2000, the Republicans hoped Bush would match or exceed Reagan's 37 percent. During the 2000 election,

the Chair of the RNC, Jim Nicholson, said "[t]he Latino community is in play in this election like never before" (Perez 2000). Many Democrats shared Nicholson's view. Los Angeles County supervisor Gloria Molina said "[t]hese people [Latinos] are not automatic anything . . . [t]hey are certainly not automatic Republicans and they are not automatic Democrats, either" (Booth 2000). Nicholson hosted several top-level campaign meetings to develop a strategic plan to target Hispanic voters. Beyond the Bush campaign placement of Hispanic English- and Spanish-language targeted advertisements, the Republican National Committee produced and placed Spanish-language television advertisements in targeted metro markets within battleground states.

Through polling, the Bush campaign estimated about 25 percent of Hispanic voters were Republicans, 35 percent were independents and 40 percent were Democrats. The Republican polling results proved to be similar to the results found in a 1999 *Washington Post* national poll conducted in conjunction with the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University (Booth 2000). In this *Washington Post* poll, 16 percent of the respondents described themselves as Republican, 40 percent as independents and 44 percent as Democrats. Additionally, the *Washington Post* poll reported

that 26 percent of the respondents described themselves as liberal, 34 percent as moderate and 34 percent as conservative. Many Republican strategists saw a target of opportunity since 34 percent of Hispanics self-identified as "conservative" while only 16 percent self-identified as "Republican," thus a potential gain of 18 percentage points.

The Republican objective was to focus on media markets that contained high concentrations of conservative and independent Hispanic voters within targeted battleground states. The Republicans had two goals regarding Hispanic voters. First, to attract enough Hispanic voters in targeted battleground states to help Bush win the presidency. Second, for Bush to match or exceed Reagan's 37 percent Hispanic voter support.

Many Republican strategists believed attracting a moderate number of traditionally pro-Democratic Latino voters to Bush would be enough to dilute the support for Al Gore in key battleground states, and thus swing these states to Bush. Many Republican strategists thought Bush could successfully attract Latino voters since Gore, at least in the beginning of the campaign, was likely to target Latino voters through the broad prism of *minority issues*. Gore's issue mix was skewed to attract African-American voters and was generally less relevant to Latinos compared to African-Americans.

The bulk of the RNC's advertising campaign was placed in the final month of the campaign. Polling in the final weeks of the campaign determined the best two issues for Republicans to focus on were education and health-care reform. This was true for both undecided general market voters and conservative and moderate Latino voters. In the final 10 days of the campaign, the RNC produced and placed two Spanish-language television advertisements that addressed education and prescription drugs/health care respectively (Guerra 2000). In California these spots appeared in the Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento, Fresno and Bakersfield television markets. In Florida they appeared in the major markets of Miami, Orlando and Tampa. Additionally, these spots appeared in Nevada and New Mexico. They also appeared in markets within the states of Pennsylvanian, Washington State, Alaska, Oregon and Georgia. The Bush campaign and the RNC also produced and placed a limited amount of Spanish-language print advertising.

Without counting the English-language Hispanic motif television advertisements that ran in proportionate rotation in Florida and New Mexico, the RNC and the Bush campaign spent at least $11 million on Hispanic outreach. The Bush campaign spent $3.5 million on Spanish-language television and radio and the RNC spent an additional $3.5 million on Spanish-

language television. The RNC and the Bush campaign also spent around $4 million on Latino grassroots outreach programs (Guerra 2000; Sosa 2003). By any measure, the Bush campaign spent more time strategically thinking about Hispanic advertising outreach, spent more money on Hispanic advertising and spent more time trying to woo Hispanic voters than any previous Republican candidate.

The fourth step in the overall strategic 2000 Hispanic outreach program was to focus on Bush the *individual*, rather than Bush the *Republican* presidential nominee. Many strategists within the Bush campaign concluded the best way to connect with Latinos was to emphasize Bush was a different kind of candidate compared to past Republican presidential candidates. Campaign strategists believed Bush had to send a message that he was going to make a fresh start with the Latino community by being more inclusive of Latinos than any prior Republican presidential candidate, and to distance himself from the Wilson philosophy of negative wedge issues.

Gary Mendoza, former deputy mayor of Los Angeles and a California Republican activist, said he hoped Latinos "don't think of George W. Bush as having an 'R' after his name" (Booth 2000). This was similar to the approach Bush used in his 1998 gubernatorial reelection campaign. During his 1998

reelection campaign, Bush ran two advertisements, one in English and one in Spanish, featuring a testimonial of a Hispanic woman saying "who cares if [Bush] is not a Democrat."

This theme of independency was extensively showcased at the Republican Convention in Philadelphia. During the night that featured cultural diversity, the Bush campaign showed an elongated feature spot produced by Sosa. During this spot, a Hispanic woman says "it kind of reminds me of the days when the Kennedy's used to go to the Latino neighborhoods, to our neighborhoods . . . they loved everybody and everybody loved them . . . that's how I feel about George W. Bush" (Sosa 2003). During other spots, Bush says "I am proud of the Latino blood that flows in the Bush family." Bush was never described, nor identified, as a Republican in any of the Latino English- or Spanish-language advertisements.

Instead of focusing on Bush's party identification, Sosa designed all the Latino outreach advertisements to focus on four critical traits that make up the *inner-core* of an ideal pro-Hispanic candidate: optimism, empathy, strength and leadership. Sosa asserts every president elected since 1952 beat their opponent on a composite basis in these four areas. Sosa asserted in 2000 that whichever candidate could convince more voters he was more optimistic,

more empathetic, stronger and a better leader, would win the presidency. Sosa was convinced exposing Latinos to George Bush's *inner-core* was critical, and if done correctly, many Latinos would vote for Bush. Beyond these four themes, Sosa also added the theme of inclusiveness to all of the Latino targeted English- and Spanish-language advertising. This approach made a lot of sense when one considers the polling research found only 16 to 25 percent of Hispanics self-identified as Republicans, yet 34 percent of all Hispanics self-identified as conservatives. The fact many Latinos distrust the Republican party can partially explain the 9- to 18-percentage point differential between party identification and political philosophy. The 1999 *Washington Post* poll found Latinos trusted Democrats by 33 percentage points more than Republicans to do a better job in dealing with the main problems of the nation. Although 68 percent of Latinos self-identified as conservative or independent, the Republican party had a major obstacle to overcome, *trust*.

The final component of the five-part strategic Latino campaign in 2000 was for Bush, if elected, to follow through on the pro-Hispanic campaign rhetoric. Many within the campaign believed Bush stood a good chance of attracting more than 40 percent of the Latino voters in 2004 *if* he remained

inclusive of the Hispanic community, empathetic to Hispanic issues, and *delivered* on the promises made during the campaign. However, if Bush did not deliver, he would be open to strong attacks by the Democrats. As Joseph Andrew, the former DNC chair, said "the Republican party cannot, with one ad campaign, erase the bad feelings that their anti-Hispanic record and exclusionary rhetoric has left within the [Latino] community" (Andrew 2000).

Bush supporters note of the 14 cabinet secretaries initially nominated by Bush, two were Latinos. One later withdrew her name from consideration. Bush also appointed a Hispanic as White House Counsel and symbolically named him in the first round of personal staff appointments. In a broader context, he has signaled his desire to be more inclusive by nominating a cabinet composed of a majority of non-white-males. Bush's 2001 cabinet may be the most diverse in America's history, at least in terms of ethnicity, race and gender. As for the importance of American-Mexican relations within the overall United States foreign policy, Republicans note Bush's first visit to a foreign country was to Mexico. It is clear Bush has attempted to be more inclusive than other Republican presidents.

Chapter 3

A Theory of Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters

Historically Hispanic turnout has been extremely low, especially relative to Anglos and African-Americans. In the 2000 presidential election, 61.8 percent of non-Hispanic Whites reported they voted, 55.7 percent of non-Hispanic African-Americans reported they voted, while 45.1 percent of Hispanic citizens reported they voted in 2000 (Census Bureau 2002b).

Unfortunately, there has not been much scholarly research as to why the Hispanic community, the largest and fastest-growing "minority community" in the United States, has historically had disproportionately low turnout rates compared to both the general voting population and to other "minority groups" such as the African-American community. Within the rubrics of "politics," disproportionately low Hispanic turnout has many ramifications that affect all levels of political interaction in the United States, from local school board races all the way up to the election of the President.

The substantially low turnout of the Hispanic community spawns many normative level questions and issues, especially since Hispanics are the United States' largest and fastest growing minority group. For most citizens,

voting is the most consequential expression of personal political values as well as the most common activity of political participation. For many individuals and groups with lower economic resources, voting is the most basic level of engagement within the political and governance systems. Ultimately the long-term legitimization of the governmental, electoral and political systems depend on voluntary involvement within these systems and the acceptance of the results produced by these systems.

Although voting is the easiest way to get involved in the political and government systems, a disproportionately large number of Hispanic citizens do not engage in voting. Over the long run, if Hispanics continue to disproportionately vote at significantly lower levels than the general populace and other minority groups, there is a possibility there will be a loss of political accountability accompanied by a disconnect in governance between elected governmental leaders and the Hispanic citizenry. For the critical issues of the Hispanic community to be addressed, Hispanics must develop and then maintain meaningful contact with the political and governmental systems. Without meaningful contact between the Hispanic community and the elected leadership, the level of governmental accountability will deteriorate, thus hurting the Hispanic community.

Neither the political science literature nor the conventional wisdom of political activism provides a simple, all-encompassing explanation of Hispanic voter turnout. There is not a single factor that causes high or low voter turnouts among the Hispanic Community. At the risk of being over simplistic, recent theoretical attempts to explain Hispanic voting behavior can be grouped into to two broad categories: *resource-based* and *mobilization-based* explanations (Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000). In an attempt to more completely explain Hispanic voter behavior, this researcher proposes a new model of behavior that draws on both resource and mobilization explanations while adding the concept *of self- activation vis-a-vis group consciousness*.

Conventional *Resource* Theories of Turnout – Primarily Based on Anglo Research

During the last several decades a strong consensus has been built around a series of *resource* models to explain political participation in general, and voting behavior in specific. The seminal research of the current resource models is the classic work of Verba and Nie (1972) when they referred to the causal relationship between socioeconomic variables and voting as the "Standard SES Model" (Nelson 1979). For many researchers and scholars, the underlying set of *socioeconomic status* (SES) variables provide the primary

and dominant explanation of voting levels and behavior. Research by Verba, Nie and other scholars have asserted citizens with higher socioeconomic status vote at higher rates than citizens with lower socioeconomic status. Initially, researchers generally defined socioeconomic status as a mix of education, income and occupation. Early research often did not distinguish which of these three interrelated factors were more consequential nor how these variables interacted with each other. The base assertion by these researchers is high levels of socioeconomic status provide the needed resources to overcome the impediments to access to the political system.

In later research by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), in their book *Participation and Political Equality*, the authors report on an elaborate seven nation research project studying political participation. The nations studied were Austria, India, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, United States and Yugoslavia. These researchers found individuals with high levels of social and economic stratification hierarchies (SES variables) possessed greater resources to be politically active. Specifically, all else being equal, citizens with higher socioeconomic status are more likely than individuals with lower socioeconomic status to be politically active. One of the main focuses of their book is the study of how individual characteristics interact with social and

institutional characteristics in relation to political behavior and participation. The underlying premise of Verba, Nie and Kim's research is socioeconomic factors, which they define as socioeconomic resource level (SERL), interrelates with voting behavior and turnout. Specifically the more personal resources one has, all other factors being constant, the higher the likelihood the person will vote.

These researchers make an interesting observation regarding voting in the seven countries studied. They assert in five of the seven countries studied, SERL plays no factor in regards to voting behavior. Yet, SERL does have a significant correlation with voting behavior in the United States and Yugoslavia. They assert in the case of the United States and less so in Yugoslavia, personal resources are critical in terms of voting behavior since it is costly to vote (e.g., strict registration laws, voting on weekdays, complex ballots, numerous elections, etc.). Simply put, because of the relatively more difficult voting processes found in the United States, as compared to the other countries studied, personal resources are critical for the United States citizens to overcome the impediments to voting.

The authors determined in most countries, because voting is an easy, low-cost act, SERL is not critical as it relates to voting. Furthermore, because

political parties mobilize voters across all socioeconomic stratas, the voting population sample in other countries approximates the representative views of the broader general public. This finding is true for voting in other countries studied, but is less true for other forms of political participation such as communal and election campaign activities.

In later research conducted by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995), the classical SES Model is further refined into a political *resource participation model* in which *resources* include more than the traditional SES variables of education, income and occupation. This evolved resource model includes *resources* such as time, money and civic skills. This total package of resources fosters and produce the essential organizational and communications capabilities needed for political involvement in order to overcome system impediments.

These researchers posit these resources are initially "acquired early in life" and "developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life: the workplace, organizations, churches and synagogues," and these resources are derived from socioeconomic status (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 271). Under this model, resources are unevenly distributed throughout the SES strata, and higher levels of SES leads to more resources available to overcome

the impediments to voting. Simply put, higher SES levels create more resources, and these increases in resources are then used to overcome the obstacles to involvement, thus increasing participation and voting. Inversely, lower levels of SES lead to lower involvement and voter rates. This refined resource model has two major improvements over the traditional SES model. First, this model establishes a mechanism to link SES to participation. Secondly, this model captures real and meaningful participation that is otherwise missed in the traditional SES model, such as low income and poorly educated citizens who are active in their churches or synagogues.

For years, many political activists and political scientists had argued impediments to voter registration were the primary causes of lower voter turnouts (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Squire, Wolfinger and Glass 1987; Highton 1997). They concluded the additional hurdle of voter registration prior to voting caused low voter turnouts. In their book *Who Votes?* Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) explore the importance of education level and other SES variables as resources to overcome restrictive registration requirements. Among all ethnic and racial populations, Wolfinger and Rosenstone assert older, more affluent and better educated citizens are

relatively more like to vote (1980). Their main finding in their book is education is the most important and potent variable relating to turnout rates.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone assert higher levels of education increase voting turnout in three different ways. First, education gives a potential voter the intellectual capacity to analyze and understand politics. Second, education creates the thirst for involvement by encouraging civic responsibility. Finally, the education process gives the potential voter a variety of bureaucratic experiences in which to develop skills, knowledge and persistence that will help the potential voter to later overcome the obstacles of voter registration laws. Research by Teixeira (1992) and Putnam (2001) further support Wolfinger and Rosenstone's findings that education substantially impacts voter turnout and strongly correlates with political participation. Simply stated, the training which one receives during his or her educational experiences better prepares them to overcome the bureaucratic impediments to voter registration and voting.

As part of their research, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) assert restrictive registration laws deter potential voters with lower education levels at higher rates than potential voters with higher education levels. This was amplified and reinforced in the later work of Squire, Wolfinger and Glass

(1987) in their research on residential mobility and voter turnouts. Wolfinger and Rosenstone as well as Squire, Wolfinger and Glass, assert if restrictive voter registration laws were liberalized and made more permissive there would be increases in voting rates within the ranks of relatively less educated citizens of society and the overall voter turnout would substantially increase by at least 9 percent.

After much pushing and lobbying, the Motor Voter Registration Act was passed in 1993, which required voter registration to be available at the same time a citizen processes the paperwork for their driver's licence and at other government offices. Proponents asserted decreases in the impediments to voter registration would lead to increases in voter registration and then lead to higher voter turnouts. In the first four years after the Motor-Voter Act was implemented, voter registration increased significantly, in fact, it was the highest registration rate in any four-year period in the United States. Yet, the Motor-Voter reforms have not significantly lead to increases in voter turnout; in fact, most measures indicate decreases in turnouts during this same period (Niemi and Weisberg 2001).

These wishful predictions that increases in voter registration would lead to increases in voter turnout is likely flawed because it was theoretically

illogical to assume registration and voting are one singular act. Timpone (1998) argues voting has too often been considered a singular, one phase process when it should really be considered a two phase decision process: phase one – to register or not to register, and phase two – if registered, to vote or not to vote. Although registering and voting are interlinked, they should be considered distinct acts and processes, since a unified model which combines registration and voting into the same analysis conceals the relationship of many of the variables during these two stages. Timpone's main focus is to disentangle the factors and variables during the registration phase from the factors and variables during the voting phase. Timpone posits different variables have different effects in each of these two stages. Clearly, the cause of decreasing turnouts is not as simple as the hurdle of voter registration.

Others like Wattenberg (1998) have asserted the overall voting system of United States is too complex and not voter-friendly, which in turn leads to lower voter turnout rates. After comparing the United States voting system to other industrialized countries of the world, Wattenberg posits our turnout is low because our voting system is complex and not voter friendly. He points out Switzerland, the only other industrialized democracy with a relatively low turnout rate, has similar election complexities as the United States. He argues

there are many aspects of the United States voting system that make it unfriendly to voters, which in turn causes low turnouts. These hindrances include lack of party relevance, too many elections, too many candidates on the ballots, a decentralized government with many different layers and levels, special districts and use of direct referenda. For Wattenberg's logic to be convincing, one would expect to see direct ties between increasing complexity and decreasing turnouts. However, in reality, these ties are weak, inconclusive or non-existent.

Others such as Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973) and Aldrich (1993) have worked to amend and revive rational actor explanations of turnout behavior by trying to address the paradox of rational choice voting as postulated by Anthony Downs (1957). Downs' expected utility hypothesis is modeled as R = (BP) - C, where Reward (R) = Differential Benefit x Probability of Occurrence (BP) - the Cost for Voting (C). In the Downsian rational actor paradox, it is irrational to vote since the costs of voting are almost always more than the benefits from voting, yet millions of citizens vote on a regular basis. Riker and Ordeshook believe in rational choice theory; however, they assert the Downsian model is incomplete, and it is due to this incompleteness that the paradox arises.

It is through their modified Downsian model that they develop a reinterpretation of the rational actor theory of voting. In their calculus they theorize it is reasonable for voters to vote and it is also reasonable for nonvoters not to vote. The authors study the weaknesses of the Downsian model and assert the model above incompletely analyzes and explains the act of voting. Riker and Ordeshook add a variable, "D," which signifies one's satisfaction from the duty of voting. They list five "satisfactions" that can occur for different voters:

1. Satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting,
2. Satisfaction from affirming the allegiance to the political system,
3. Satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference,
4. Satisfaction from the mere act of voting (for some, the act of voting is more a satisfaction and then it is a cost) and
5. Satisfaction from affirming one's efficacy in the political system.

Riker and Ordeshook thus modify the Downsian model to include the satisfaction variable within the model: R = PB - C + D. They then test their model using Survey Research Center data from the 1952, 1956 in 1960

presidential elections. After running the data calculations, the authors assert their modified rational choice theory accounts for most cases of voting and non-voting. Specifically, they posit potential voters use a rational calculus to decide whether to vote or not to vote. The Riker and Ordeshook's model is a significant improvement on the Downsian model; however, the development of their model has potential shortcomings. First, the asserted interrelationship between C and D needs more defining and development. Second, the power of the D variable – the satisfaction from the duty of voting – is so strong in their model, that if just R and D were studied, it is likely that for most people R = D.

Over the years, the Standard SES Model has evolved into a set of modified resource theories that have often included many elements of rational actor theories. Recent work by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) illustrates this new version of the resource model that includes rational actor precepts when it asserts individuals vote or do not vote based on a calculation of utility given the resources available to the individual and the potential derived benefits to the individual.

In general, resource theories explain many of the basic underlying elements of voter turnout; however resource theories fail to completely and

accurately explain turnout. Furthermore, when it comes to theories of minority voting behavior, such as African-American and Hispanic voter turnout, resource theories significantly fail to capture the total dynamics of minority group voting behavior and turnout. One logical explanation as for why resource models fail to fully explain African-American and Hispanic turnouts is the fact almost all the resource research results are based the predominate study of Anglo populations. Clearly, more research and theoretical development is needed in order to more accurately, and more completely explain Hispanic and African-American turnout behavior.

Mobilization Explanations of Voter Turnout Behavior

In order to develop a more complete explanation of turnout, several scholars have posited a tie between mobilization and turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000; DeSipio, de la Garza and Setzler 1999; de la Garza and DeSipio 1994). Most of these researchers have asserted mobilization-based models and variables can complement resource models in order to develop a more complete model to explain voter turnout and behavior.

Pure resource models theoretically assert increases in education levels, combined with reductions in structural voting barriers, will increase voter

turnout in the United States; yet voting turnout in the United States has declined significantly over the last four decades even though education levels have increased and impediments have decreased. With this type of incompleteness in the pure resource model, researchers should embrace the idea of complementary, explanatory variables and models in order to build better models with more compete explanations.

Shaw, de la Garza and Lee theorize the increases in attempts to mobilize Latino voters by Latino groups should correlate with increases in Latino turnout. Their research did find support for adding a mobilization variable to the traditional resource variables of income, age and political attitudes. By adding the mobilization variable, operationalized by the number of times contacted by Latino groups, their hybrid model significantly improved the completeness and accuracy of their model. Many of the theoretical underpinnings and findings of Rosenstone and Hansen's 2001 research supports many aspects of the findings in the mobilization research by Shaw, de la Garza and Lee. It should also be noted in light of the significant correlation between Latino group mobilization efforts and Latino turnout, it is logical to theorize Hispanic voting behavior is significantly different from Anglos.

As to why voter turnout in the United States has continued to decrease when education levels have continued to increase, Rosenstone and Hansen posit the voter turnout decline in the United States is not caused by distrust in government nor a generalized alienation from the political system. Instead, they assert the decline can be explained in large part because of a decline in mobilization, political efficacy, partisan identification and satisfaction rates with the choices of the candidates. Rosenstone and Hansen strongly posit there has been a dramatic decline in one-to-one, labor-intensive canvassing. Specifically, *old school* partisan mobilization efforts have declined and been replaced by macro-media appeals. It is because of this depersonalization of mobilization efforts have lead to reduction in turnouts. Rosenstone and Hansen also point out activist social movements have also declined, which meant there was a reduction in non-partisan group mobilization.

The significant importance of face-to-face mobilization as a factor of voting turnout is also supported in Gerber and Green's (2000) research on personal canvassing affects on voter turnout. They assert the increase in impersonal voter mobilization efforts of both non-partisan and partisan organizations have been a major factor in the decrease in voter turnout. Prior to 1960, election campaigns were driven mostly by face-to-face contact with

voters; yet since 1960, campaigns have used far less face-to-face tactics and used much more macro-electronic media tactics. Over the years, grassroots party activists have been replaced by pollsters, media consultants and high-tech phone banks. Gerber and Green assert although campaigns are contacting more voters than ever, the depersonalization of these modern campaign tactics has contributed to the deterioration of voting turnout.

Clearly SES attributes of individual citizens alone are not sufficient to account for the decline in voter turnout, nor can SES variables explain why Hispanic voter turnout is so disproportionately low compared to Anglos and African-Americans. The depersonalization of mobilization efforts by parties, campaigns and social movements can significantly help to explain the reduction in voter turnout in the overall voting electorate. More specifically, it is theorized the inclusion of mobilization variables improves the explanation of Hispanic voting behavior and turnout. However, a resource and mobilization hybrid model remains incomplete. For example, resource and mobilization variables together fail to explain why Hispanics vote at rates so much lower than African-Americans, especially when SES variables are controlled for in the analysis. A critical factor or set of factors is still missing in the explanation of Hispanic voter turnout.

Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters – The Missing Turnout Factor

Historically, Hispanic turnout has been extremely low, especially when compared to Anglos and African-Americans. Antunes and Gaitz (1975) in their early research on Mexican-American voting behavior in Houston, found even when socioeconomic variables are controlled for, Mexican-Americans voted at significantly lower rates than Anglos and African-Americans. Yet, in spite of the significantly low turnout of the largest minority group in the United States, scholarly political science research regarding Hispanic voting behavior is shockingly sparse, and empirical work regarding Hispanic voter turnout specifically has been especially sparse (Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2004; Marbut 2005). One should note that scholars have conducted very nominal research regarding Hispanics, yet scholars have published a significant body of research regarding the voting behavior of African-Americans.

When this researcher conducted a topic search of the *J-Stor* electronic storage library regarding Hispanic and African-American issues, the relative lack of scholarly research regarding Hispanics as compared to African-Americans was stunning. When a *J-Stor* search was conducted for the nine[2]

major political science journals in the *J-Stor* archives, this researcher found only 14 journal articles with *Hispanic(s)* or *Latino(s)* in the title in the entire *J-Stor* archive. For the same period of time, using the same journals, this researcher found 124 journal articles with *African-American(s)* or *Black(s)* in the title. Of the 14 Hispanic journal articles found, seven of these also had *African-American(s)* or *Black(s)* in the title too. This meant there were only seven articles dedicated solely to Hispanic and Latino issues while there were 117 articles dedicated solely to African-American and Black issues.

Most resource models developed over the last four decades have relegated non-SES variables, such as ethnicity, to inconsequential levels of explanation, often failing to even mention ethnic and racial type variables. Most proponents of SES resource models do not acknowledge a role for ethnicity nor ethnic group mobilization in their explanation models. Yet, researches such as Greeley assert ethnic "background is a meaningful predictor of political participation in American society . . . [and ethnic] impact does not go away when social class is held constant" (1974, 170). Greeley, strongly posits any serious analysis of voting behavior must include ethnic variables. In research conducted around the same time, Antunes and Gaitz

assert “ethnicity is most important in explaining the differences” in voting (1975, 1199).

Nelson (1979) posits there are two major reasons why most scholars do not include ethnicity in the development of voter behavior models. First, researchers are so “steeped in the normative dimensions of the ‘melting pot’ myth that they are unwilling (are unable) to conceive of ethnicity as an enduring and important element of social division” (Nelson 1979). Second, it is very complex and difficult to separate the affects and effects between class and ethnicity. Yet, Nelson asserts normative views of the melting pot are just myths and should not interfere with empirical research. Nelson further asserts even though there is a correlation between class and ethnicity, it is easy and necessary to distinguish conceptually between ethnicity and social class because ethnicity involves national origin, religion and race, whereas social class involves education, wealth and income.

Hispanics and African-Americans should not be assumed to have the same voting behavior patterns. However, since there has been much more research on African-Americans, it is possible African-American research and studies can provide a theoretical starting point in which to develop a more complete model of Hispanic turnout.

Tate (1991), in her study of African-American political participation, asserts African-American turnout in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections may in part be explained by *surge-and-decline* effects created by the precedent-setting campaigns of Jesse Jackson. Tate uses a longitudinal panel telephone study to investigate the political context of African-American voter turnout during the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections. She explores the effects of traditional socioeconomic predictors like education, home ownership and income, as well as standard predictors like age, partisanship, political interest and political trust on voter turnout. Tate also examines the effects of church membership and membership in African-American political organizations on voter turnout. Beyond these socioeconomic, standard predictor and contextual variables she explores the impact of Jesse Jackson's presidential candidacy on African-American voter turnout. She posits the African-American voter turnout in the 1984 presidential election, which reached an all-time peak at 55.8 percent, can be largely explained by the surge-and-decline effects generated by the candidacy of Jackson. Tate asserts this argument is similar to Angus Campbell's 1960 surge-decline theory of peripheral voters since African-American "peripheral voters" drop off because of a "dissatisfaction with the electoral choices offered" (1991, 1172).

Shaw, de la Garza and Lee (2000) assert Latino turnout can be best explained by combining resource-based and mobilization-based models. These scholars develop a Latino voter turnout model that blends elements of resource and ethnic group mobilization together. Drawing in part on the theoretical underpinnings of Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1995) resource theory, which itself is an amalgamation of rational choice and SES models, Shaw, de la Garza and Lee assert there are four sets of variables that can explain Latino voter turnout. The first three variable sets draw on resource theory factors, specifically: political attitudes, life cycle variables such as age and home ownership, gender, church attendance and traditional socioeconomic variables. The fourth variable set draws on mobilization theory, specifically variables that measure contact by Latino activist organizations and political parties. Their analysis found SES, income, life-cycle, political attentiveness, age and home ownership were powerful factors in determining Latino turnout. Beyond these variables, which are similar to Anglo turnout factors, they found mobilization factors, such as contacts by party and Latino activist organizations, were also powerful variables in determining turnout. Simply put, they assert SES variables alone cannot fully

explain Hispanic turnout, and adding an ethnic group mobilization variable provides a more complete model of explanation.

Tate makes similar assertions in regards to African-American voters as do Shaw, de la Garza and Lee in their Hispanic voter research. Tate asserts age and education are generally interconnected with African-American voter turnout, however, Tate's research finds African-American turnout cannot be fully accounted for by traditional socioeconomic and demographic variables. Tate posits involvement in African-American organizations and membership in politically active African-American churches provide community-based resources that increase voter turnout. Through organizational involvement in the community, individuals who may be individually resource poor are still activated and mobilized.

Tate also asserts office seeking by African-Americans positively stimulates and increases turnout within the African-American community. Researchers and activists have noticed this African-American turnout phenomenon in large city mayoral elections. Tate theorizes we can explain African-American voting patterns in predominantly African-American cities in terms of this concept of surge-and-decline. When viable African-American candidates run in predominantly African-American communities, African-

American voting surges because more *peripheral* voters are motivated and activated to vote. Conversely, when viable African-Americans do not run, voting declines because peripheral voters are not motivated to vote.

Examples of African-American surge-and-decline include when Carl Stokes, an African-American, first ran for mayor of Cleveland in 1967. In his election, approximately 80 percent of all registered African-Americans voted (Nelson 1987). This unprecedented turnout helped lead Stokes to victory. In Chicago, during the 1983 election in which African-American candidate Harold Washington was running for mayor, the African-American voting turnout was about 85 percent (Kleppner 1985).

Tate's (1991) surge-and-decline theory is a group empowerment, group consciousness theory that draws heavily from the principles of the surge-and-decline theory developed by Angus Campbell (1960) and later modified by James Campbell (1987). The Campbell and Campbell surge-and-decline theory asserts voter turnout can be explained in terms of *peripheral* voters who tend to vote only in *high-stimulus* elections, which are either high profile campaigns or precedent-setting elections. Specifically, since peripheral voters lack sufficient interest to habitually vote, on the average, peripheral voters will vote at higher rates when there is a surge of information and

interest in a candidate. As DeNardo (1980) describes it, peripheral voters are simply *fickle* about getting to the voter both, and it takes a significant level of activation to mobilize peripheral voters.

Bobo and Gilliam's (1990) research supports the pivotal underlining principles of Tate's surge-and-decline theory. Specifically Bobo and Gilliam found African-Americans from *high-black empowerment areas* are more active than African-Americans from low-black empowerment areas. These surges seem to be driven by two factors. First, African-American candidates campaign more actively in African-American neighborhoods. Second, a sense of empowerment activates voters *vis-a-vis* African-American group consciousness (Shingles 1981). In all of these cases there was a steady decline of African-American turnout after the initial surge. Shingles asserts the causal connection between African-American consciousness and African-American participation is so strong that it mostly explains why African-Americans at times have been more politically active than Anglos when controlling socioeconomic variables.

One should be cautious when doing research about Hispanic turnout not to *a priori* assume Hispanics and African-Americans have the same voting behavior patterns. These two demographic groups have very diverse historical

origins and cultural stories in regards to their American experience. Yet, the effects of Hispanic community pride and group consciousness may be similar to the African-American community during high-profile, precedent-setting elections. Scholars have never studied Hispanic turnout through the prism of *Surge-and-Decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters*.

It is likely surge-and-decline effects on peripheral Hispanic voters is the missing turnout factor that more fully completes the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee Latino turnout model. One possible bridge between the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model and the model proposed in this study may be that the *over-reporters* described in the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model significantly overlap with the *peripheral* voters in the surge-and-decline model. The Shaw, de la Garza and Lee study made some very interesting observations about the over-reporters which is supported by the research of Silver, Anderson and Abramson (1986). They assert this group is composed of educated and civic minded citizens who are politically efficacious. These are the same factors that strongly influence voter turnout. These researchers suggest this group of over-reporters is a "critical population *waiting to be mobilized*" (Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000, 344). Assuming these researchers have not missed a critical variable that explains the over-reporting, this is a very important

observation. Conceivably, the self-over-reporters and peripheral voters may makeup virtually the same group of Hispanics. The possible overlap between over-reporters and peripheral voters who have yet to be activated should be researched, but this is not a focus of this research.

One final note before this researcher presents a new turnout model based on Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters. It is necessary for researchers to be cognizant of the biases present in Latino self-report surveys. The significant Latino over-reporting found in the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee serves as a warning to all researchers of similar topics that the research effects of over-reporting must be addressed in the research design. It is thus critical to use validated survey results or actual voter turnout results, such as results from highly concentrated Latino precincts, when studying Hispanic turnout behavior.

Theorized Model of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters

By including mobilization efforts of Hispanic organizations, the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model represents a significant improvement in explaining Hispanic turnout and voting behavior when compared to standard resource models. Figure 1 illustrates a new theorized model of Hispanic

turnout that is an extension of the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model. It is theorized when the full effects of Hispanic surge-and-decline are added to the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model, a significantly more complete model of Hispanic behavior is developed.

Figure 1 illustrates the proposed theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters. The top purple oval represents all the voters who vote in a particular election, including habitual voters with high SES and resources levels. The violet diamond represents peripheral Hispanic voters who are activated to vote through Hispanic surge-and-decline effects. The bottom light cream box represents habitual non-voters.

In Figure 1, the left blue arrow represents the mobilization effects of Latino organizations activities that are posited in the 2000 work of Shaw, de la Garza and Lee. The right red arrow represents self-activation effects vis-a-vis group consciousness, similar to the African-American effects described in Tate's 1991 work. It is necessary to note some voters are *double activated* by both Latino group outreach effects and by self-activation effects of group consciousness. The combined effects of mobilization by Latino groups and self-activation *vis-a-vis* group consciousness create the overall effects of

surge-and-decline on peripheral voters. Functionally, this new theorized model categorizes Hispanic registered voters into three sub-groups:

1. Habitual Voters – registered voters who have relatively higher SES/Resource levels who almost always vote,
2. Peripheral Voters – registered voters who have relatively higher SES/Resource levels who at times are activated to vote by mobilization and/or self-activated by group consciousness effects,
3. Habitual Non-Voters – registered voters who have relatively lower SES/Resource levels who are perennial non-voters, and who are not responsive to activation by the effects of mobilization nor group consciousness effects.

Although mobilization and group consciousness are different in form and substance, they do certainly interact with each other. Hispanic surge-and-decline effects is the nexus between the uniquely Hispanic effects of mobilization by contacts of Hispanic groups, and group consciousness and empowerment effects created when viable Hispanic candidates run for office. The combining of the overall effects of Hispanic surge-and-decline with the

basic resource model produces a significantly more complete model of Hispanic voting behavior.

Chapter 4

Analysis of Hispanic Voter Turnout in San Antonio Mayoral Elections

Case Study One

It is advantageous to start a study such as this one by examining local level election data in order to tease out voting trends and tendencies occurring in statewide and national elections that *prima facie* may be masked or suppressed by extraneous factors. An ideal jurisdiction in which to begin the examination of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory would be a highly populated large city that has an embedded high percent Hispanic population and has had a history of viable Hispanic mayoral candidates.

There have been only a few cases of non-Cuban Hispanic candidates who have viably run for mayor in large cities in the United States. Of these cases, only Federico Peña in Denver, Henry Cisneros in San Antonio and Ed Garza in San Antonio have successfully won their races for mayor. Unfortunately, there has been nominal research conducted on these elections with viable Hispanic mayoral candidates or on Hispanic voting behavior in relation to Mayors Cisneros, Pena and Garza. Because San Antonio has had

the most cases of viable non-Cuban Hispanic candidates running for mayor, San Antonio was chosen as the jurisdiction to conduct the first case study.

San Antonio Case Study

Like studying genetic DNA variation in Norway, San Antonio provides an excellent forum in which to study the effects of Hispanic office seeking candidates on, and in relation to, Hispanic voter turnout. Hispanics have comprised about 60 percent of the San Antonio population for decades, with most of the Hispanic community living in highly concentrated homogeneous geographical pockets; thus providing an ideal opportunity to isolate Hispanic voting effects under a variety of political scenarios. The wide assortment of political scenarios, following the implementation of court-ordered single-member districts in 1977, allows researchers to uniquely isolate critical voting variables under different conditions. Beyond the four Cisneros mayoral elections in the 1980s, San Antonio has had other viable Hispanic contenders run for mayor. In 1991, sitting Councilperson Maria Berriozabal narrowly lost the mayor's race in a run-off election, and then in 1997, community activist Maria Elena Torralva and sitting Councilperson Henry Avila both ran unsuccessful bids for mayor. Then in 2001, sitting Councilperson Ed Garza successfully won his race for mayor.

The focus of this research is to determine if there is evidence of surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters. Specifically, this research measures the effects of viable Hispanic mayoral candidates on Hispanic turnout. It is theorized the surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters can – at least in part – explain Hispanic turnout behavior. If Hispanic turnout significantly rises when a viable Hispanic mayoral candidate runs and decreases when no viable Hispanic mayoral candidates run, one can argue the data supports the theory of surge-and-decline effects within the San Antonio Hispanic voting community. Additionally, it is hypothesized turnout will steadily drop after precedent-setting elections. This study defines these elections as *desensitizing elections*.

Time Series Analysis of the Last 13 San Antonio Mayoral Elections

This paper studies all 13 of the San Antonio mayoral elections after court ordered single-member district elections were implemented in 1977. The data is from the general mayoral elections, which are held in April or May during odd number years (San Antonio City Clerk 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001). In order to minimize extraneous variables, run-off elections are not studied.

In 1977, San Antonio's total population was less than one million. By 2001, San Antonio's population was more than one million, making it one of the 10 most populous cities in the United States. During the time of this study, Hispanics comprised about 58 percent of the population, Anglos about 34 percent, African-Americans about 7 percent and other ethnic groups about 1 percent. Additionally, in gross population terms, San Antonio has been the third to fifth largest Hispanic city in the United States during the years of this study (Census Bureau Report 2004b).

The mayor of San Antonio serves two-year terms, and since 1991, the office is limited to two terms. As with most Texas cities, San Antonio mayoral elections are nonpartisan. Prior to single-member districting in San Antonio, the Good Government League (GGL), nominated and promoted every successful candidate for mayor for more than two decades, with just one exception. The court-ordered, single-member districting in 1977 led to the ultimate downfall of the GGL. The fall of the GGL created an environment where *sub rosa* race politics became a proxy for traditional partisan politics. Since San Antonio elections are non-partisan, party identification effects are almost non-existent, while ethnic and racial effects are strong.

In order to isolate the behavioral effects of Hispanic voters from Anglo voters, United States Census data is used to identify census tracts that remained 80 percent or more Hispanic for the time of the study (Census Bureau Report 2001b). The census tracts that are more than 80 percent Hispanic are overlaid on top of San Antonio voting precinct maps. These steps are repeated to identify the 80 percent or more Anglo voting precincts. Fortuitously, the census tracts and precincts line up almost perfectly. Of the 193 highly concentrated precincts identified in 2001, only four precincts do not line up with the census tracts.[3] In order to maximize relative ethnic homogeneity, these four precincts are excluded from the data analysis. The precincts studied are then divided and grouped into Hispanic and Anglo precincts with the voting results tabulated for each election. The precinct level *deltas*, the election-to-election changes for each precinct, are then calculated. The accumulated Hispanic and Anglo results are then averaged for each election.

It is critical to note using actual voting results from highly concentrated Hispanic and Anglo precincts, rather than data from self-report studies, allow researchers to control for the variances caused by self-over-reporting survey data. Furthermore, it is critical to note the use of election-to-

election *delta* data provides additional controls for extraneous factors, such as SES variables, which isolates election-to-election effects.

These 13 elections are then divided into three different groups of elections: projected Hispanic *surge elections*, projected Hispanic *decline elections* and projected Hispanic *desensitizing elections*. Based on the theory of surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters, surge elections are projected in the years when viable Hispanic candidates are running in their first race for mayor. The 1981, 1991, 1997 and 2001 elections are classified as projected Hispanic surge elections since Henry Cisneros in 1981, Maria Berriozabal in 1991, Maria Elena Torralva in 1997 and Ed Garza in 2001 respectively ran for their first time for mayor of San Antonio. There are two sub-types of *surge* elections. The first type is the first time effort of any viable Hispanic candidate to run for mayor, Cisneros in 1991. The second type includes the later elections that involve first time individual efforts by other viable Hispanic candidates trying to win the office that was won by Cisneros earlier.

Since the 1977 election is the first single-member district election held in San Antonio's history, one can logically argue it should be considered a surge election since it is both a high-profile election and a precedent-setting

election with racial and ethnic undertones. However, since this is the first year of single-member districting, there is no way to develop an accurate baseline in which to compare the 1977 election against; therefore the 1977 election is not coded as a surge election.

The 1979, 1989, 1993, 1995 and 1999 elections are classified as projected Hispanic decline elections since no viable Hispanic candidates ran for mayor. The Cisneros mayoral reelection campaigns from 1983 through 1987 are classified as projected Hispanic desensitizing elections. The results for Hispanic and Anglo voters are then analyzed and graphed by election-to-election and percentage voter turnout change.

Findings of the Time Series Analysis of the 13 San Antonio Mayoral Elections

The most important finding is all the projected surge-and-decline elections studied conform to the hypothesized projections of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory [see Figure 2]. The data strongly supports the surge-and-decline theory of Hispanic voting behavior, both in real terms and in relative terms to Anglo voting behavior.

For all the projected surge elections, the average election-to-election Hispanic voter turnout increase is 93.0 percent which is significantly higher

than the Anglo voter turnout increase of 37.9 percent [see Figure 2]. Furthermore, Hispanic "surges" are higher in all four projected surge elections than Anglo increases [see Figure 3]. Conversely, and supportive of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory, for the projected decline elections, the average Hispanic election-to-election decline of -43.2 percent is a significantly greater decrease than the average Anglo decrease of -21.2 percent [see Figure 2]. Additionally, the Hispanic declines are greater than the Anglo decreases in each and every projected decline election [see Figure 4].

For the sequence of desensitizing elections the average percentage decline in Hispanic turnout is -5.2 percent [see Figure 2]. This drop clearly supports the notion of slight declines during desensitizing elections. Of the projected Hispanic desensitizing elections studied, only the 1983-85 election sequence initially appears not to fit the theory [see Figure 5]. A possible explanation for this aberration is the fact the 1983 election is the only election in the 13 elections studied when there is no viable Anglo candidate for mayor, thus possibly explaining the Anglo "surge" in the following election when a viable Anglo ran. This explanation is noteworthy since the 1983 election is the only election, of the 13 elections studied, that Hispanic turnout exceeded

Anglo turnout. During this election, Hispanic turnout exceeded the Anglo turnout by 7.0 percentage points [see Table 1].

Initially, it appears the 1983-85 desensitizing election sequence may not appear to fit the projected model; however, in relative terms, with no "viable Anglo" running, one can argue that the 1983 Hispanic data compared to the 1983 Anglo data actually fits the model of surge-and-decline with the Anglo turnout declining because there is no viable Anglo running. Overall, the time series analysis data of the 13 elections from 1977 through 2001 strongly supports the theory of surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters in San Antonio mayoral elections. When there is a viable Hispanic running, Hispanic turnout goes up, when there is no viable Hispanic running, the turnout goes down.

In the San Antonio case study, there are two sub-types of *surge* elections, one involves the first time effort of any viable Hispanic candidate to run for mayor, Cisneros in 1991, and later elections that involve first time individual efforts by other viable Hispanic candidates trying to win the office that was won by Cisneros earlier. The time series analysis suggests there is no statistical distinguishing difference between these two types of surge elections.

San Antonio Regression Analyses of the 1991 through 2001 Elections

In addition to the time series analysis of highly homogenous precincts above, multiple regression analyses are utilized to study precinct-to-the-same-precinct net turnout change between the six mayoral elections from 1991 through 2001 for all precincts. In order to isolate the hypothesized possible effects of surge-and-decline at the most discrete level, the net percentage point change in voter turnout for the same precinct on an election-to-election basis is used as the dependent variable.

It is very important to note that this novel research design compares same-precinct-to-same-precinct data on an election-to-next-election basis, thus controlling for most extraneous factors such as changes in SES variables, demographic variances and over reporting, which allows for a more discreet and meaningful study of possible surge-and-decline effects.

Precinct-by-precinct data from the San Antonio City Clerk for voter turnout and voter registration is used to calculate turnout for each precinct, for each of the six elections studied (San Antonio City Clerk 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001). The net change in percentage point turnouts for each precinct on an election-to-election basis is then calculated and used as the dependent variable (election-to-election percentage point change). Precincts

with raw turnouts of less than nine voters and raw registration of less than 100 people are excluded from the study in order to control for possible errant variances caused by precincts with disproportionately low populations.

Several independent variables are then analyzed in relation to the net turnout change dependent variable. The first independent variable used, *Viable Hispanic Dummy*, is a dummy variable for change in viable Hispanic mayoral candidate running status (e.g., no viable Hispanic to viable Hispanic, viable Hispanic to no viable Hispanic or no change). The second independent variable used, *Incumbency Dummy*, is a dummy variable for change in mayoral incumbency running status (e.g., no incumbent to incumbent, incumbent to no incumbent or no change). An interaction term is also created for the *interaction variable between the viable Hispanic dummy and the incumbency dummy*. The final independent variable in the model, *percent registered Hispanic*, uses precinct level ethnic data from the "Federal Elections Project" (Lublin and Voss 2001).

Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline, it is hypothesized there will be a positive and significant correlation between the net change in the turnout dependent variable with the viable Hispanic dummy independent variable and with the percent registered Hispanic independent variable.

Additionally, based on prior research by other scholars, it is hypothesized there will also be correlation with the change in incumbency independent variable. Specifically, when there is an incumbent, turnout will drop. It is also hypothesized there could be a small correlation between the change in turnout dependent variable with the interaction term between the viable Hispanic and incumbency variables.

San Antonio Findings Support Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Theory

The results of the linear regression analyses of turnout change on an election-to-election basis between the six San Antonio mayoral elections from 1991 through 2001 also strongly support the fundamental concepts of the theory of surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters. When regressing the net change in voter turnout dependent variable with the hypothesized model using the four independent variables described above (e.g., viable Hispanic, incumbency, the interaction between viable Hispanic and incumbency and percent registered Hispanic), the model's R^2 value is .575, with all four independent variables significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level [see Table 2].

Furthermore, when the percent registered Hispanic variable and the combined interaction term are controlled for, the partial correlation coefficient

between the viable Hispanic running variable and the percent turnout change variable is .6999, and is significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level.

The results of these regressions are instructive because they illuminate the underlying mechanics of the surge-and-decline theory in which the viable Hispanic mayoral candidate dummy variable and the percent registered Hispanic variable are both significantly and positively correlated with the net percentage change in the dependent variable.

The analysis also found a relatively smaller correlation between incumbency and turnout. It should be noted the standard coefficient for the viable change in Hispanic running dummy variable is 271 percent larger than the coefficient for the change in the incumbency dummy variable. Thus, Hispanic surge-and-decline effects are significantly more robust than incumbency effects.

Simply put, when a viable Hispanic runs for mayor in San Antonio, Hispanic voting turnout surges both in real terms and relative to Anglo surges. Whereas, when no viable Hispanic candidates run, Hispanic turnout declines both in real terms and relative to Anglo declines. There needs to be further research of elections in other jurisdictions to determine if the strong support of

surge-and-decline theory found in the San Antonio case study can be generalized to a wider set of elections, populations and jurisdictions.

Chapter 5

Analysis of Hispanic Turnout in New Mexico Gubernatorial Elections

Case Study Two

In order to test the generalizability of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory beyond the confines of mayoral elections in San Antonio, the New Mexico gubernatorial elections from 1990 through 2002 are analyzed *vis-a-vis* the prism of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory. Similar to San Antonio, New Mexico has a high percent Hispanic population and has had a variety of viable Hispanic candidates run for governor, thus providing a conceptually rich setting in which to study Hispanic surge-and-decline theory.

According to the United States Census Bureau, Hispanics and Latinos comprised 42.1 percent of the New Mexico population in 2000 (Census Bureau Report 2004c). In addition to having a high Hispanic percentage of population, there have also been several Hispanic candidates who have run for Governor including Bill Richardson, a Democrat who won in 2002 and former Secretary of Energy, Martin Chavez a Democrat Party candidate in 1998 and Mayor of Albuquerque, and Roberto Mondragon a Green Party candidate in

1994 and former Lieutenant Governor. Interestingly, since statehood in 1912, New Mexico has elected five Hispanic governors.

New Mexico Case Study

In 1990, former Democratic Governor Bruce King won his third non-consecutive term for governor over Republican Frank Bond, 54.7 percent to 45.3 percent respectively (New Mexico Secretary of State 1990). However, in 1994, incumbent Governor King lost his reelection bid to Republican Gary Johnson, who had never held political office before and was not expected to win. Johnson's surprise win can mostly be explained by the strong third-party candidacy of Green party candidate Roberto Mondragon. Mondragon, a former Democratic Lieutenant Governor of New Mexico turned Green party gubernatorial candidate, received more than 10 percent of the 1994 vote thus causing incumbent Democrat King to lose (New Mexico Secretary of State 1994). Mondragon's strong showing within the Hispanic community may in part be explained by the fact that neither the Democratic nor the Republican parties had a Hispanic candidate running for governor.

Incumbent Governor Johnson, in his 1998 reelection bid, beat Democratic challenger Martin Chavez, former Mayor of Albuquerque, 54.5 percent to 45.5 percent respectively (New Mexico Secretary of State 1998).

Due to term limits, incumbent Governor Johnson was not able to run for reelection, thus creating an open gubernatorial seat. In 2002, the Republicans nominated John Sanchez, a freshman state legislator from Albuquerque, to run for governor. On the Democratic side, former Secretary of Energy and former New Mexico United States Congressman Bill Richardson was nominated. This was the first time since 1918 that both the Republican and Democratic candidates for governor were Hispanic. Richardson won overwhelmingly 55.5 percent to Sanchez's 39.1 percent (New Mexico Secretary of State 2002).

Like the San Antonio case study, the purpose of the New Mexico case study is to determine if there is evidence of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects. It is hypothesized Hispanic surge-and-decline effects can – at least in part – explain Hispanic turnout behavior. If Hispanic turnout significantly rises when a viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidate runs and decreases when no viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidates run, one can argue the data supports surge-and-decline effects within the New Mexico voting community. Furthermore strong support of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects would exist if there is a positive correlation between the interaction term composed of the viable Hispanic running variable and the percent of Hispanic population variable with the net change in turnout dependent variable.

Since only two counties have Hispanic populations of more than 80 percent and there are five counties with significantly high Native-American percent of populations, the use of the 80 percent threshold time series analysis used in the San Antonio case study to isolate the effects between Hispanics and Anglos is not feasible for the New Mexico case study. However, the use of regression analysis is both feasible and instructive.

New Mexico Regression Analyses of the 1990 through 2002 Elections

This study analyzes the last four gubernatorial elections in New Mexico from 1990 through 2002. The data used is from November general elections in non-presidential election years (New Mexico Secretary of State 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002). New Mexico governors serve a term of four years, and are allowed to serve up to two consecutive terms. By the year 2000, according to the United States Census Bureau, New Mexico had a population of more than 1.8 million people, approximately 44 percent Anglo, 43 percent Hispanic, 10 percent Native-American and 4 percent other (Census Bureau Report 2004c). In terms of percent of population, New Mexico has the highest proportion of Hispanic population compared to any other state in the United States.

The regression analyses conducted for the New Mexico case study are relatively similar to the regression analyses in the San Antonio case study. The major difference in the analytical method used between these two case studies is county level data is used in New Mexico, whereas precinct level data is used in the San Antonio case study. County level data is used because there is no similar validated precinct level data for New Mexico as there is for Texas in the "Federal Elections Project" precinct level data. Multiple regression analyses are utilized to study county-to-the-same-county net turnout change among the four gubernatorial elections from 1990 through 2002. In order to isolate the hypothesized possible effects of surge-and-decline, the net percentage point change in voter turnout for the same county on an election-to-election basis is used as the dependent variable.

New Mexico Secretary of State voter turnout and voter registration data on a county-by-county basis is used to calculate turnout for each county, for each of the four elections studied (New Mexico Secretary of State 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002). The net change in percentage point turnout for each county on an election-to-election basis is then calculated and used as the dependent variable (election-to-election percentage point change).

The New Mexico case study uses the same basic model used in the San Antonio case study with just one important modification to address multicollinearity. Both the *Incumbency Dummy* variable (e.g., change in gubernatorial incumbency running status) and the *interaction variable* are dropped from the model, and are replaced with a newly created *interaction variable among the viable Hispanic dummy, the incumbency dummy and percent Hispanic Population variables*. The *Viable Hispanic Dummy*, which represents the change in viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidate running status, is still used (e.g., no viable Hispanic to viable Hispanic, viable Hispanic to no viable Hispanic or no change). The third independent variable, *Percent Hispanic Population*, is used as a proxy for Hispanic voter registration in the New Mexico case study.

Since this research design compares same-county-to-county data on an election-to-next-election basis, many of the external variances, such as self-overreporting and changes in SES factors, are controlled for, thus allowing for a better isolation of possible surge-and-decline effects. Furthermore, in order to isolate the Hispanic effects from Anglo effects, the five counties with high and above average Native-American populations are dropped from the analyses. Additionally, counties with raw turnouts of less than 3,000 voters

are excluded from the study in order to control for possible errant variances caused by counties with extremely disproportionately low populations.

Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline, it is hypothesized there will be a positive and significant correlation between the net change in the turnout dependent variable with the viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidate running variable. It is also hypothesized there will be a correlation between the dependent variable and the interaction term among the Hispanic dummy, the incumbency dummy and percent Hispanic Population variables.

New Mexico Findings Support Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Theory

The results of the linear regression analyses on an election-to-election basis among the four gubernatorial elections from 1990 through 2002 strongly support the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters. When regressing the net change in voter turnout dependent variable with the hypothesized two variables described above (e.g., the viable Hispanic dummy and the interaction variable between viable Hispanic running, incumbency and county percent Hispanic variables) the model's R^2 value is .738, with both independent variables being significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level [see Table 3].

As with the San Antonio case study, the New Mexico analysis yields a robust and significant standard coefficient of .823 for the viable Hispanic candidate running independent variable [see Table 3]. Additionally, similar to the San Antonio case study, the New Mexico analysis also shows a correlation between incumbency and percent Hispanic population through the interaction term which has a standardized coefficient of .254 [see Table 3]. The stand alone Hispanic population variable is not found to be significant.

Overall, the regression analyses support the anecdotal information, such as in the 1994 gubernatorial election, that when a viable Hispanic runs for governor in New Mexico, Hispanic voting turnout surges, and when no viable Hispanic candidate runs, turnout declines.

Chapter 6

Analysis of Hispanic Voter Turnout in Colorado Senatorial Elections

Case Study Three

In order to affirm the generalizability of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory, the sequence of Colorado senatorial elections from 1992 through 2004 is used as the third case study. The use of Colorado senatorial elections expands the analysis of this research to a third state, to a third type of election and to a third level of governmental election data. As with the San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, the Colorado case study analyzes elections through the prism of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory.

Colorado Case Study

According to the United States Census Bureau, Hispanics and Latinos comprised 17 percent of the population of Colorado in 2000 (Census Bureau Report 2004d). The same report shows the Anglo percent of population at 69 percent, with all other racial groups at 14 percent. In addition to having a sizable Hispanic voting block, the Colorado case study of senatorial elections from 1992 through 2004 ends with the hypothesized surge election of Ken Salazar. The 2004 election of Democrat Salazar is one of the few

United States Senate elections to ever have had a viable Hispanic candidate run, thus providing a hypothesized surge election to study at the United States Senate level. Additionally, the Colorado senatorial case study provides an unique opportunity to look at the effects, correlations and interactions with overlapping presidential campaigns that neither the San Antonio case study nor the New Mexico case study provide.

This case study starts with the 1992 Senate election to fill the seat of retiring Democratic Senator Tim Worth. In this election, Democrat Ben Nighthorse Campbell defeated Republican candidate Terry Considine 51.8 percent to 42.7 percent (Colorado Secretary of State 1992). In the next Senate election in 1996 to fill the seat of retiring Republican Senator Hank Brown, Republican Wayne Allard defeated Democrat Tom Strickland 51.1 percent to 46.1 percent respectively. The 1998 Senate election is noteworthy because incumbent senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell had switched parties and was now running as a Republican against Democrat Dottie Lamm. Senator Campbell defeated Lamm 63.0 percent to 35.3 percent. In the 2002 Senate race, the final result was almost an exact replay of the 1996 election since now incumbent Republican Allard defeated challenger Strickland 51.0 percent to 46.0 percent. The final election analyzed in this

sequence of elections was the 2004 election between Democrat Ken Salazar and Republican Pete Coors. In this election, Salazar defeated Coors 51.3 percent to 46.5 percent.

Like the prior two case studies of San Antonio and New Mexico, the purpose of the Colorado case study is to determine if there is evidence of surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters. This case study analyzes the effects of having no viable senatorial Hispanic candidates running during the 1992 through 2002 elections compared to having a viable senatorial Hispanic candidate run in the 2004 race. It is hypothesized Hispanic surge-and-decline effects can partially explain Hispanic turnout behavior in this sequence of Colorado senatorial elections studied. Specifically, it is hypothesized there will be a surge in the 2004 Hispanic voter turnout relative to the Anglo turnout relative to the other elections in the sequence studied. Furthermore, it is hypothesized there will be moderate interaction effects between turnout and the independent variables relating to presidential election years and the incumbency status of the senatorial candidates.

Similar to the San Antonio case study, the Colorado senatorial study conducts a time series analysis of high percent of population Hispanic counties compared to high percent of population Anglo counties. As with the

San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, regression analyses are also utilized. As with the prior two case studies, all the election data and dummy terms are coded in terms of election-to-election changes thus controlling for most of the extraneous effects. Finally, like the New Mexico case study, the Colorado data uses county level data.

Time Series Analysis of the Last Five Colorado Senatorial Elections

In order to isolate the behavioral effects between Hispanic voters and Anglo voters, United States Census data is used to identify counties with high percent of Hispanic populations and counties with high percent of Anglo populations (Census Bureau Report 2004d). Unlike the San Antonio case study, Colorado has no counties with 80 percent or more Hispanic population, therefore the 80 percent threshold method used in the San Antonio case study cannot be used. However, unlike the New Mexico case study, there are no counties with high percent of Native-American populations, therefore there are no methodological complexities caused by high Native-American percent of populations in Colorado. For this case study, the top eight counties with the highest percent of Hispanic population are coded as high Hispanic counties while the top eight counties with the highest percent of Anglo population are coded as high Anglo counties.

The percent of populations for the high Hispanic counties range from 38 to 68 percent Hispanic, while the percent of populations for the high Anglo counties range from 93 to 97 percent Anglo. This segmentation provides a clear delineation between high Hispanic counties and high Anglo counties in which to conduct the analysis. The county level election-to-election changes for each county are then calculated. The accumulated results for the set of Hispanic counties and the set of Anglo counties are then averaged for each election.

Again, it is crucial to note that using actual voting results from highly concentrated Hispanic and Anglo counties, rather than self-reporting data, allows researchers to control for variances caused by self-over-reporting survey data. Furthermore, the use of election-to-election *delta* changes, on a county-to-same-county basis, provides additional controls for extraneous factors, thus providing better isolation for the effects being studied.

The four election-to-election sequences for these five elections are then classified as either projected surge elections or projected decline elections depending on the election-to-election change in viable Hispanic candidate running status. The election sequences from 1992 through 2002 are all classified as decline elections since there are no viable Hispanic candidates

running. Since Ken Salazar ran as the Democratic candidate in 2004 and there was no viable Hispanic candidate in 2002, the 2002 to 2004 election sequence is then classified as a surge election. The results of the Hispanic and Anglo counties are then aggregated, analyzed and graphed based on election-to-election percentage change. The surge-decline measurement for Colorado is scaled using percentage point change, which is different from the San Antonio case study that used percent of change. San Antonio necessitated percent change since there is a multitude of relative changes in the surge-desensitizing-decline projections.

Findings of the Time Series Analysis of the Colorado Elections

Of the four election *delta* sequences studied, three significantly conform to the hypothesized projections of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory [see Figure 6], while the fourth, the 1996 to 1998 election sequence, is statistically inconclusive. More important, when the three projected decline elections are averaged and compared to the 2000 to 2004 projected surge election sequence, the findings are robust, both in real terms and in relative terms to Anglo voting behavior [see Figure 7].

Overall, the time series analysis data of the five Colorado senatorial elections from 1992 through 2004 strongly support the theory of surge-and-

decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters. When there is a viable Hispanic senatorial candidate running, Hispanic turnout goes up, both in real terms and relative to Anglo turnout. Whereas, when there is no viable Hispanic senatorial candidate, Hispanic turnout is lower on an average relative to Anglo turnout.

Colorado Regression Analyses of the 1992 through 2004 Elections

In addition to the time series analysis above, multiple regression analyses are utilized to study county-to-same-county net turnout change data among the five Senatorial elections from 1992 to 2004. In order to isolate the hypothesized possible effects of surge-and-decline, the change in the net percentage point of voter turnout for the same county on an election-to-election basis is used as the dependent variable. This novel research design of comparing county-to-county data, on an election-to-election basis, controls for most extraneous variances such as changes in SES variables and over-self-reporting.

County-by-county turnout and voter registration data from the Colorado Secretary of State is used to calculate turnout for each county, for each of the five elections studied (Colorado Secretary of State 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004). The net change in percentage point turnout for each

county on an election-to-election basis is then calculated and used as the dependent variable (election-to-election percentage point change). This is the same dependent variable used in the San Antonio and New Mexico case studies.

The Colorado case study uses a similar base model, with similar independent variables used in the New Mexico case study, with one important modification to the Colorado model. Of the five elections studied, the 1992, 1996 and 2004 senatorial elections overlap presidential elections, whereas the 1998 and 2002 senatorial elections do not overlap presidential elections. Therefore, unlike the New Mexico case study, which has no overlapping presidential elections, the Colorado model must include modeling for presidential elections. In order to prevent multicollinearity while addressing the overlapping presidential elections, an interaction variable is constructed between an *incumbency dummy* and a *presidential election dummy*. Like both the San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, the *viable Hispanic dummy*, which represents the change in viable Hispanic candidate status, is still used. Additionally, the third independent variable, percent Hispanic population, is used as a proxy for Hispanic voter registration.

As with the New Mexico case study, the Colorado case study uses county-to-county level. Also like the New Mexico case study, counties with raw turnouts of less than 3,000 voters are excluded from the study in order to control for possible errant variances caused by counties with extremely low populations and relatively disproportionate weightings.

Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline, it is hypothesized there will be a positive and significant correlation between the net change in turnout dependent variable with the viable Hispanic senatorial candidate running independent variable. It is also hypothesized there could be a correlation between the net change in turnout dependent variable and the interaction term between incumbency and presidential election. It is unknown whether the interaction term will be positive or negative since the presence of overlapping presidential campaigns could be hypothetically positive whereas the incumbency status could be hypothetically negative.

Colorado Findings Support the Theory of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline

The results of the linear regression analyses on an election-to-election basis among the five senatorial elections from 1992 through 2004 strongly support the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters. When regressing the net change in voter turnout dependent variable

with the hypothesized independent variables described above (e.g., the viable Hispanic dummy and the interaction term between incumbency and presidential elections) the model's R^2 value is .814, with both independent variables being significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level [see Table 4].

Similar to both the San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, the Colorado analysis yields a robust and statistically significant standard coefficient of .738 for the viable Hispanic candidate running independent variable [see Table 4]. As hypothesized, there is a correlation between the dependent variable and the interaction term that incorporates incumbency and presidential elections. The standard coefficient for the interaction variable is -.243 [see Table 4]. The stand alone Hispanic population variable is not found to be significant.

Both the time series analysis and the regression analyses of the five most recent Colorado senatorial elections strongly support the theory of surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters. Specifically, when a viable Hispanic senatorial candidate runs for office, the data strongly indicates Hispanic voting turnout surges, and when no viable Hispanic candidate runs, turnout declines.

It is important to note that if one were to take into account the recent increases in the non-citizen population in Colorado, the results of the Colorado case study would likely be even more robust than the results contained in this study since their could be a statistical dampening effect. Although the issue of non-citizenship is not the focus of this study, noting the possibility that the underlying results may even be more robust is important, since it would strengthen the argument of this study. Because San Antonio and New Mexico have had relatively smaller increases in the non-citizen population than Colorado, the San Antonio and New Mexico results would likely not be effected as much as the Colorado results.

Chapter 7

The Theory of Surge-and-Decline:

A Powerful Tool to Understand Hispanic Voting Behavior

There are several critical factors and trends that have made the Hispanic voting community one of the most important political demographic groups in United States politics, especially in recent presidential elections. The foremost reason for the increased importance of the Hispanic community is its sheer size. Beyond being the largest racial or ethnic minority group in the United States, the Hispanic community is also the fastest growing minority group, both in terms of the overall population and in terms of the voting electorate.

The fact that the Hispanic population in the United States is mostly concentrated in 11 states with a total of 217 Electoral College Votes also helps to explain the increase in the targeting of Hispanic voters by the Republican party, as well as the renewed interest in the Hispanic vote by the Democratic party. Of these 11 highly concentrated Hispanic states, four of them remained "battleground" states throughout the 2004 presidential campaign. These four states, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada and Florida, contain a total of 47

Electoral College Votes, and are comprised of 42 percent, 25 percent, 20 percent and 17 percent Hispanic respectively.

The Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects Model – a More Complete Model

Hispanics have lower SES resources, such as education and income, relative to Anglos, but so do African-Americans, yet African-Americans vote at significantly higher rates than Hispanics. Furthermore, many studies have shown when SES variables are controlled for, African-Americans have at times voted at rates even higher than Anglos in the post civil rights era, while Hispanic voter turnout significantly and traditionally lags behind both Anglos and African-Americans. Traditional SES resource type models alone fail to capture the total dynamics of minority group voting behavior and turnout. One logical explanation as for why traditional resource models fail to adequately explain African-American and Hispanic voting behavior is almost all the research on resource models is predominately based on the study of Anglo sample populations. Shaw, de la Garza and Lee's model, which adds mobilization explanations to traditional resource explanations, makes a significant improvement in explaining Hispanic voter turnout; however, their model is still incomplete.

In an attempt to more completely explain Hispanic voter turnout, this researcher postulates a new construct that draws on both resource and mobilization explanations while adding the concept of *self-activation vis-a-vis group consciousness*. The theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters analyzed in this study hypothesizes group empowerment actuates when viable Hispanics seek office, thus surging turnout.

The data analyses from the three diverse case studies examined in this paper, strongly support Hispanic surge-and-decline theory: when viable Hispanic candidates seek office, Hispanic turnout increases significantly relative to both Anglo turnout and baseline Hispanic turnout, and when no viable Hispanic runs for office, Hispanic turnout decreases relatively. As with Angus Campbell's theory of surge-and-decline, peripheral voters turnout less often when they are dissatisfied with the candidate choices offered, and they are activated to vote at higher rates when they like the choices presented to them. The surge effects are amplified by high-stimulus elections that have high profile candidates or by precedent-setting elections. The combined effects of mobilization by Latino groups and self-activation vis-a-vis group

consciousness create the overall effect of surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters.

Of the 18 San Antonio mayoral and the five Colorado senatorial elections studied in the time series analyses, all but two conform to the hypothesized surge-and-decline outcomes. The first is the San Antonio 1983-1985 sequence, which is unusual because no viable Anglo candidate ran in 1983 and the second one is the Colorado 1996-1998 sequence which is not statistically significant either way. More important, when the projected San Antonio and Colorado elections are aggregated and averaged by type, all the averages for the projected surge, decline and desensitizing elections conform perfectly to the theory of surge-and-decline. A meaningful time series analysis is not possible for New Mexico since New Mexico has several counties with very high percent Native-American population, which makes it impracticable to isolate Hispanic and Anglo turnouts.

In addition to the time series analyses, multiple regression analyses are also conducted for the three case studies of the San Antonio mayoral elections, the New Mexico gubernatorial elections and the Colorado senatorial elections. The results from the multiple regression analyses for all three case studies strongly support the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on peripheral

Hispanic voters. The standardized coefficients for the change in the viable Hispanic candidate status variable in the models are .655, .823 and .738 for San Antonio, New Mexico and Colorado respectively and are all significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. What is striking in all three case studies is the fact that the viable Hispanic factor is more robust than the other variables studied including incumbency and overlapping presidential elections.

The fact that these case studies represent three different states, at three different levels of data, in three different jurisdictions, in electorates that include low, medium and high concentrations of Hispanic populations, and in elections with and without overlapping presidential elections posits for wide generaliziblity of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory.

Peripheral Hispanic voters are activated through surge-and-decline effects, in part by mobilization and in part by self-activation *vis-a-vis* group consciousness. The surge-and-decline model incorporates activation from mobilization effects and self-activation through group consciousness effects. This amalgamated theory represents the interaction between uniquely Hispanic mobilization by Hispanic groups, and group consciousness and empowerment that is actuated when viable candidates run for office.

Implications of the Surge-and-Decline Model

Throughout much of the last 40 years, the Democratic party's take-Hispanics-for-granted approach combined with the Republican party's neglect approach has often lead to overall neglect and lack of mobilization within the Hispanic community. Exacerbating the broad lack of engagement by both major parties has been a historical lack of viable Hispanic candidates who run for office.

On one side, the Democratic take-for-granted approach has left an opening for the Republicans to make gains with the Hispanic voting populace. On the other side, the Republicans' *shallow skimming* of Hispanic voters via macro-electronics, which may be a cost efficient way to pickup votes in the short term, will likely prove to be too *thin* to be sustainable over the long term. If the Democrats want to close the door on the Republicans, they must not take the Hispanic voting population for granted. Conversely, if the Republicans want to expand their initial gains, they must become more substantive and relevant in terms of policy. Ultimately, just being open and inviting to the Hispanic community is not enough to win substantial and sustaining percentages of the Hispanic voter.

Both parties need to conduct active grassroots mobilization efforts in addition to macro-electronic advertising if they want to be truly successful. For the Democrats, this means conducting comprehensive, multi-faceted outreach campaigns like the Kennedy and Clinton campaigns did during their elections. For the Republicans, this means adding real grassroots efforts that go beyond the last minute media blitzes attempting to skim votes. The recent successes of Republicans George Bush, John McCain and Michael Bloomberg illustrate the fact Hispanic voters are not as loyal to the Democratic party as they once were, and Republicans can make significant inroads into the Hispanic community with properly executed campaigns. Conversely, the blowback caused by the California propositions and comments from candidates such as Pete Wilson have severely damaged the Republican chances to make significant gains in some jurisdictions like California. In the short term, *style* is what opens the communication channels, however, over the long haul, substance is what really matters.

In many ways, the neglect by the Democrats and the schizophrenia of the Republicans has created a situation where a significant proportion of the potential voting Hispanic populace is agnostically in the middle, loyal to neither party and mobilized by none. Normatively, it will benefit the Hispanic

community if both Democrats and Republicans actively try to engage, persuade, mobilize and compete for potential Hispanic voters.

The potency of the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline on peripheral Hispanic votes is observed when theoretically projecting out the possible increase in turnout caused by having a viable Hispanic candidate run for either President or Vice President in 2008.

Recent trends indicate the total Hispanic vote is increasing and is trending toward the Republicans. Even though the estimates vary, it is the conventional wisdom that approximately 6 million Hispanics voted in 2000 and at least 7.5 million voted in 2004, a net increase of at least 25 percent (WCVI/SVREP 2004; NCLR 2004; NEP 2004). In 2000, the Voter News Service, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *New York Times* reported that Hispanics voted 35 percent, 38 percent and 31 percent respectively for an average about 35 percent for the Republican Presidential candidate Bush. Then in 2004 the National Election Poll, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *New York Times* reported Hispanics voted 44 percent, 45 percent and 43 percent respectively for an average about 44 percent for the Republican Presidential candidate Bush, thus representing a nine percentage point gain in support by the Republicans. Using these estimates, the Republican

presidential ticket in 2004 received about 3.3 million votes from Hispanics while the Democratic ticket received about 4.2 million votes from Hispanics, for a differential of 900,000 votes favoring the Democrats [see Figures 8 and 9].

Projecting out to the 2008 presidential election, using a *current trends model* with the Republican candidate receiving about 44 percent of the Hispanic vote with a Hispanic turnout of at least 9.5 million voters, the Republicans would receive about 4.2 million Hispanic votes while Democrats would receive about 5.3 million Hispanic votes, for a differential of 1.1 million votes favoring the Democrats [see Figures 8 and 9].

Projecting out to 2008 election using a *Hispanic surge-and-decline model with a viable Hispanic on the national Democratic ticket for President or Vice President*, turnout could go up an additional 20 percent to around 11.3 million due to activation of peripheral voters. It is possible the Democratic slate would receive 70 percent or more of the Hispanic vote, which would be slightly better than Clinton averaged in his two races. Using these potentially conservative assumptions, Republicans would receive about 3.4 million Hispanic votes while Democrats would receive about 7.9 million Hispanic votes, for a sizeable and significant differential of 4.5 million votes

favoring the Democrats. This would give the Democrats an additional 3.4 million Hispanic votes above the *current trends model* [see Figures 8 and 9].

Conversely, projecting out to 2008 election using a *Hispanic surge-and-decline model with a viable Hispanic on the national Republican ticket for President or Vice President*, turnout could go up an additional 15 percent to around 10.8 million due to activation of peripheral voters. With this scenario it is possible the Republican slate could receive upwards to 60 percent of the Hispanic vote, which would follow the current trend with an amplification for surge-and-decline effects. The potential for the Republicans to receive upwards to 60 percent of the Hispanic vote is bolstered by such polls as the *Washington Post*-Kaiser-Harvard poll that found 68 percent of Latino voters describe themselves as either conservative or moderate (Booth 2000). Using these assumptions, Republicans would receive about 6.5 million Hispanic votes while Democrats would receive about 4.3 million Hispanic votes, for a sizeable and very significant differential of 2.2 million votes favoring the Republicans. Thus creating a positive swing toward the Republicans of 3.3 million Hispanic votes compared to the *current trends model* [see Figures 8 and 9].

Simply put, the Hispanic voting community is up for grabs. Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters, this researcher posits that the first party to select a viable Hispanic vice presidential candidate, and ultimately a viable presidential candidate, will be the party that wins in the short term, and will be the party that realigns the majority of Hispanic voters in the long term, for at least three to four decades.

Notes

1. The Hispanic community is so diverse that descriptive terminology is often inadequate and sometimes controversial within the broader Hispanic community. In a *Newsweek* poll conducted June 25-30, 1999 by Princeton Survey Research Associates, *Newsweek* found that most Hispanic Americans prefer to be called "Hispanics" rather than "Latinos." Of the 505 Hispanic adults surveyed nationwide, 55 percent preferred the term *Hispanic*, 22 percent preferred the term *Latino* and 21 percent preferred both terms equally or had no preference (*Newsweek* 1999). Among the different major media outlets, there is generally no accepted "stylization" for which term journalists should use. For example, the *Wall Street Journal* generally uses "Hispanic" whereas the *Los Angeles Times* often uses "Latino." The United States Census Bureau officially uses "Hispanic." For the purposes of this study, the terms *Hispanic(s)* and *Latino(s)* are used interchangeably.

2. *America Journal of International Law*, *American Political Science Review*, *International Organization*, *Journal of Politics*, *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *World Politics*, *American Journal Political Science* and *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*.

3. The number of precincts per year studied fluctuated around 145. The geographic area is the same for each election of the study and always maintained the 80 percent or more relative ethnic concentration. Doing this allowed the study to control for many extraneous geographic and regional variables. The 80 percent or more threshold is maintained for each group, for all the elections studied. Additionally, it should be noted inward migration can not be controlled for in this study.

Figures

Figure 1
Theorized Model
Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters



Figure 2

Average of Projected Hispanic Surge, Decline and Desensitizing Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change



Figure 3

Projected Hispanic Surge Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change



Figure 4

Projected Hispanic Decline Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change



Figure 5

Projected Hispanic Desensitizing Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change



Figure 6

Projected Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Elections
Colorado Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change



Figure 7

Average of Projected Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Elections
Colorado Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change



Figure 8

Presidential Election Model Projections
Hispanic Votes by Party



Figure 9

Presidential Election Model Projections
Net Democratic Advantage vs. Net Republican Advantage of Hispanic Votes



Tables

Table 1
Voter Turnout for the 1977 through 2001 San Antonio Mayoral Elections

		Turn-out AA %	Turn-out Hisp %	Change Turn-out Hisp %	Turn-out Ang %	Change Turn-out Ang %	Change Turn-out Hisp - Ang	Average Overall Turnout %	Hispanic less Anglo % Diff.
1977	Cockrell - Monfrey	31.1%	34.5%		39.0%			35.9%	-4.5%
1979	Cockrell - Becker	27.1%	25.1%	-9.4%	33.8%	-5.2%	-4.2%	28.0%	-8.7%
1981	Cisneros - Steen	29.5%	40.9%	15.8%	45.6%	11.8%	4.0%	42.0%	-4.7%
1983	Cisneros - The Field	10.2%	20.5%	-20.4%	13.5%	-32.1%	11.7%	17.6%	7.0%
1985	Cisneros - Pyndus	27.8%	30.3%	9.8%	38.9%	25.4%	-15.6%	33.3%	-8.6%
1987	Cisneros - Pyndus	19.5%	26.2%	-4.1%	33.2%	-5.7%	1.6%	28.5%	-7.0%
1989	Cockrel - The Field	11.0%	11.1%	-15.1%	25.3%	-7.9%	-7.2%	16.8%	-14.2%
1991	Wolf - Berriozabal	19.9%	24.4%	13.3%	40.1%	14.8%	-1.5%	30.5%	-15.7%
1993	Wolf - The Field	16.8%	17.8%	-6.6%	30.2%	-9.9%	3.3%	22.6%	-12.4%
1995	Thornton - Turner	12.9%	10.3%	-7.5%	24.1%	-6.1%	-1.4%	16.2%	-13.8%
1997	Peak - Torralva	13.0%	12.1%	1.8%	22.0%	-2.1%	3.9%	16.5%	-9.9%
1999	Peak - The Field	3.9%	4.6%	-7.5%	10.9%	-11.1%	3.6%	7.3%	-6.3%
2001	Garza - Bannwolf	11.9%	12.5%	7.9%	18.2%	7.3%	0.6%	15.0%	-5.7%
		18.0%	20.8%	-1.8%	28.8%	-1.7%	-0.1%	23.9%	-8.0%

Table 2

Standardized Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of
San Antonio Mayoral Elections 1991-2001

Model	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
R^2	.487*	.557*	.570*	.575*
Change in Viable Hispanic Mayoral Candidate (Dummy)	.698	.657	.654	.655
Interaction Variable: Hispanic Dummy x Incumbency Dummy		.268	.472	.484
Change in Mayoral Incumbency (Dummy)			-.232	-.241
Percent registered Hispanic				.068

* All variables are significant at the 99.9% level or higher.

n = 1480 precincts

Table 3

Standardized Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of New Mexico Gubernatorial Elections 1990-2002

Model	(A)	(B)
R^2	.674*	.738*
Change in Viable Hispanic Gubernatorial Candidate (Dummy)	.821	.823
Interaction Variable: Viable Hispanic x Incumbency x County Hispanic Percent		.254

* All variables are significant at the 99.9% level or higher.

n = 59 counties.

Table 4

Standardized Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of Colorado Senatorial Elections 1992-2004

Model	(A)	(B)
R^2	.776*	.814*
Change in Viable Hispanic Senatorial Candidate (Dummy)	.881	.738
Interaction Variable: Incumbency Dummy x Presidential Election Dummy		-.243

* All variables are significant at the 99.9% level or higher.

n = 163 counties.

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Vita

Robert Gordon Marbut Jr. was born in Savannah, Georgia, on May 5, 1960, the son of Robert Gordon Marbut Sr. and Huberta Dodd Marbut. After graduating from Alamo Heights High School, San Antonio, Texas in 1978, he entered Claremont Men's College, Claremont, California. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree with a Full Triple Major in Economics, Political Science and Psychology (Honors Graduate) in 1983. He went on to earn a Master of Arts degree in Criminal Justice from the Claremont Graduate School in 1985. In December 2003, he received a Masters of Arts in Government from The University of Texas at Austin.

Robert was selected and awarded a CORO Post Graduate Fellowship of Public and Urban Affairs from the CORO Foundation, 1983-1984, Los Angeles, California. He was later selected and awarded a White House Fellowship, 1989-1990, Washington, D.C.

Robert has served in a multiple of business, civic, governmental and political campaign capacities including being a member of the United States Olympic Committee Officer's Group, being a staff member to President George H.W. Bush in the Executive Office of the President, serving as *Mayor*

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Currently Robert is an Assistant Professor at Northwest Vista College, San Antonio, Texas. He has also lectured and taught both graduate and undergraduate courses in the academic fields of special event operations, tourism management, marketing, political communications, political polling, political psychology and survey research at the University of Texas at San Antonio and Incarnate Word College, San Antonio, Texas.

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